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Inclusionary Eminent Domain
GeraldS. Dickinson*
This Article proposes a paradigm shift in takings law, namely
"inclusionary eminent domain." This new normative concept serves as a
framework that molds eminent domain takings and economic
redevelopment into an inclusionary land assembly model that is equipped
with multiple tools to help guide municipalities, private developers and
communities construct or preserve affordable housing developments. The
tools to achieve this include Community Benefits Agreements ("CBAs'),
Land Assembly Districts ("LADs"),
Community Development
Corporations ("CDCs"), Land Banks ("LABs"), Community Land Trusts
(CLTs) and NeighborhoodImprovement Districts ("NIDs').
The origins of the concept derive from the zoning law context, where
exclusionary zoning in the suburbs excluded affordable housing for lowincome residents. Courts intervened, applying exclusionary zoning
doctrines, which led to the enactment of inclusionary zoning programs to
achieve a fair share of housing. Exclusionary eminent domain in urban
areas, similarly, has displacedand decreased the stock of or denied access
to affordable housing through the power of takings. Under an exclusionary
eminent domain doctrine, courts would apply heightened review to
condemnations in a locality that has less than its fair share of affordable
housing. But in a post-Kelo era of takings, doctrinal solutions may not be
enough.
Analogous to inclusionaryzoning, inclusionary eminent domain helps us
rethink how to fix these ubiquitous land problems. Indeed, this Article
moves us beyond the doctrinal muddle and instead incorporatesboth the
intellectual musings of takings and zoning law with an assessment of how
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innovative tools can be practically applied to construct and preserve
affordable housing in eminent domain takingsfor economic redevelopment.
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INTRODUCTION

Inclusionary eminent domain is a new normative conceptparadoxical in nature-that rethinks eminent domain takings as an
inclusionary land assembly process structured through a framework that
is equipped with multiple tools to help guide municipalities, private
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developers and communitiest construct or preserve affordable housing
within economic redevelopment projects. This idea is particularly
important where condemnation threatens the loss of affordable housing
and displacement of low-income residents. This new paradigm is ex
ante and ex post; that is, the exercise of inclusionary eminent domain
would assemble land or negotiate the use of land-prior to, during or
after condemnation proceedings-to accommodate affordable housing
developments within economic redevelopment projects.
The tools to achieve this include Community Benefits Agreements
("CBAs"), Land Assembly Districts ("LADs"), Community
Development Corporations ("CDCs"), Community Land Trusts
("CLTs"), Land Banks ("LABs") and Neighborhood Improvement
Districts ("NIDs"). Here, the tools are adjusted from their traditional
purpose to fit within this new eminent domain paradigm. This new
framework gives private developers, municipalities and communities a
more transparent set of tools that guide the development process to
reduce the phenomena of displacing residents and decreasing the supply
of affordable housing. Indeed, this Article calls for developers,
municipalities and communities to rethink how to plan for inclusion.
Part I draws parallels between exclusionary zoning and exclusionary
eminent domain by revisiting the purpose, use and abuse of local zoning
powers and takings in the United States. In particular, this Part
discusses briefly how exclusionary zoning actively excluded affordable
housing by artificially raising the property values and the price of rent
beyond the income levels of low-income families, thereby denying them
access to residential property in affluent neighborhoods. 2 The practice

1. The term "community" is used interchangeably in this Article with "property owners,"
"residents" or "low-income families."
2. For a comprehensive discussion of exclusionary zoning, see Lawrence Gene Sager, Tight
Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Protection, and the Indigent, 21 STAN. L. REV. 767

(1968) (applying the equal protection doctrine to exclusionary zoning situations). See generally
RICHARD BABCOCK & FRED BOSSELMAN, EXCLUSIONARY ZONING (1973) (discussing how land
use controls have resulted in the exclusion of those with low or moderate incomes); Frank A.
Aloi, Arthur Abba Goldberg & James M. White, Racial and Economic Segregation by Zoning:

Death Knell for Home Rule?, 1 U. TOL. L. REV. 65 (1969) (discussing a constitutional economic
right to suburban housing); William Fischel, An Economic History of Zoning and a Cure for Its

Exclusionary Effects, 41 URB. STUD. 317 (2004) (outlining the history of zoning and proposing
home-equity insurance to reduce the demand for exclusionary zoning); Harold A. McDougall,
The Judicial Struggle Against Exclusionary Zoning: The New Jersey Paradigm, 14 HARV. C.R.-

C.L. L. REV. 625 (1979) (examining the New Jersey Supreme Court's actions involving
exclusionary zoning); John R. Nolon, A Comparative Analysis of New Jersey 's Mount Laurel

Cases with the Berenson Cases in New York, 4 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 3 (1986) (comparing two
state court decisions regarding exclusionary zoning that led to vastly different results); John M.
Payne, Delegation Doctrine in the Reform of Local Government Law: The Case of Exclusionary

Zoning, 29 RUTGERS L. REV. 803 (1976) (exploring the defects of the doctrinal approach to
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forced courts to look narrowly at a zoning code's intended purposes, called
exclusionary zoning doctrine, which essentially provided that a local
municipality's fair share obligation is presumptive and if low-income
families make a prima facie case of exclusion, then the burden shifts to the
municipality to prove otherwise. Part I then links the effects of zoning
with eminent domain by revisiting the purpose, use and abuse of
eminent domain for the public purpose of urban renewal and economic
redevelopment in urban areas. Specifically, these sections of Part I
show how, similar to exclusionary zoning, the trajectory of the
phenomenon of "exclusionary eminent domain"-from Berman3 to the
modem day takings doctrine applied in KelO4-has displaced poor
communities, upended middle-income homes and generally decreased
the stock of or denied access to affordable housing for primarily lowincome residents.5
Coined by David Dana at Northwestern University School of Law,
"exclusionary eminent domain doctrine" is a proposal analogous to the
exclusionary zoning doctrine. 6 Under Dana's proposal, courts would
apply heightened review to takings challenges, invalidating a

exclusionary zoning being employed in New Jersey); John M. Payne, Title VIII and Mount
Laurel: Is Affordable Housing FairHousing?, 6 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 361 (1988) (discussing

the affordable housing movement as a secondary effect of Title VIII of the 1968 Civil Rights
Act); Jerome G. Rose, New Additions to the Lexicon of ExclusionaryZoning Litigation, 14 SETON

HALL L. REV. 851 (1984) (discussing new legal concepts related to exclusionary zoning created
by the New Jersey Supreme Court in Mt. Laurel

I); Peter H. Schuck, Judging Remedies: Judicial

Approaches to HousingSegregation, 37 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 289 (2002) (discussing how the
courts have taken the initiative to reach the goal of residential diversity); Norman Williams, Jr. &
Thomas Norman, Exclusionary Land Use Controls: The Case of North-EasternNew Jersey, 22

SYRACUSE L. REV. 475 (1971) (analyzing the use of exclusionary land use controls in the outer
suburban ring in northeastern New Jersey); Norman Williams, Jr. & Edward Wacks, Segregation
of Residential Areas Along Economic Lines: Lionshead Lake Revisited, 1969 Wis. L. REv. 827,

838-39 (1969) (discussing the discriminatory effect of minimum building size requirements).
3. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 34 (1954) (holding that maintaining community health was
a legitimate public purpose, regardless of private or public transfer thus enforcing the
government's power of eminent domain).
4. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 484 (2005) (holding that city's exercise of
eminent domain power in furtherance of economic development plan satisfied constitutional
"public use" requirement).
5.

See David A. Dana, Exclusionary Eminent Domain, 17 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 7, 20-23

(2009) (discussing the effects of post-Kelo refonns).
6. Id. at 13. Exclusionary zoning doctrine was born primarily from the Mt. Laurel cases in
New Jersey, where the courts looked closely at local zoning ordinances and provided that a local
municipality's fair share obligation to construct affordable housing for low- to moderate-income
families within its zoning code is presumptive. If the plaintiffs (usually low-income households)
make a prima facie case of exclusion, then the burden shifts to the municipality to prove
otherwise. Exclusionary zoning thus imposes an obligation on the municipality to plan for the
inclusion of low- to moderate-income rental units in cooperation with private developers based on
the regional needs for such housing.
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government taking if there is a loss of a fair share percentage of
affordable housing from the development project.7 The developer can
avoid the doctrinal limitation by substituting the anticipated loss of
affordable housing with the construction of new housing units at belowmarket rates within the locality.8
Dana's proposal eloquently tells us what is wrong with exclusionary
eminent domain and tells us why heightened judicial review in takings
cases is important to protect property owners and residents from
displacement and from the loss of affordable housing. However, his
doctrinal proposal does not show us how to construct or preserve
affordable housing in cooperation with those most affected by
condemnation-low-income communities and residents-who are
increasingly at risk in the post-Kelo era. This Article flips the eminent
domain paradigm and addresses a link that Dana does not discuss in his
proposal; that is, the parallels between inclusionary zoning and
inclusionary eminent domain. Here, this Article offers a variety of
alternative methods to fix the exclusionary eminent domain
phenomenon where courts are reluctant to decide takings challenges
based on the amount of affordable housing lost from condemnation. By
refraining the eminent domain conversation from a normative doctrinal
analysis to a normative conceptual analysis, the role of affordable
housing becomes a centerpiece rather than an afterthought in economic
redevelopment projects.
Part II conceptualizes the eminent domain paradigm proposed in this
Article by analogizing inclusionary zoning to inclusionary eminent
domain. This Part first revisits the history, usefulness and limitations of
inclusionary zoning as a court-ordered remedy to halt exclusionary
zoning, which originated from the Mt. Laurel saga in New Jersey. 9
New Jersey courts found that municipalities had violated state
constitutional law by setting zoning requirements in areas to levels that
excluded and segregated low-income affordable housing in remote and
inopportune areas only accessible to the poor. In response to the
phenomenon of exclusionary zoning, affordable housing became a
centerpiece of zoning laws. Courts mandated that municipalities
provide a realistic opportunity for a fair share of affordable housing for
low- and moderate-income residents that would be needed immediately
and in the future. In further response to the mandates, inclusionary
zoning programs were enacted by state legislatures to fix the
7. Id. at 28-30.
8. Id. at 52.

9. See infra note 39 and accompanying text.
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exclusionary zoning problem by employing land use control tools such
as builder's remedies, set-aside programs, density bonuses and in-lieu
fees to achieve a fair share construction of affordable housing for lowand moderate-income households.10
Analogous to inclusionary zoning, inclusionary eminent domain is a
framework to think about how to fix the exclusionary eminent domain
phenomenon and remedy condemnations that threaten the loss of
affordable housing. This section of Part II unpacks this new eminent
domain paradigm by explicating elements that embody the conceptinclusionary
housing,
meaningful
engagement,
community
participation, collective action and public approval-and then
explaining why each element helps redefine the meaning of "public
use" as that which is deeply ingrained in the community. While the
tools of inclusionary zoning sought to remedy the exclusion and
segregation of low- to moderate-income residents by exclusionary
zoning policies, the tools of inclusionary eminent domain seek to
remedy low-income and middle-income residents affected by
exclusionary eminent domain. This inclusionary model is equipped
with a toolkit that conceptually and practically embodies each element.
Part III explains in detail the kit of land assembly and land
negotiation tools that give effect to the concept of inclusionary eminent
domain. In other words, this toolkit of CBAs, LADs, CDCs, CLTs,
LABs and NIDs guides municipalities, private developers and
communities on how to engage in inclusionary, not exclusionary, land
assembly using eminent domain. Indeed, the "bundle of tools"
proposed here mitigates and tempers some of the exclusionary effects
caused by the proverbial "bundle of sticks." The purpose of the tools is
to reach the goals set forth in an economic redevelopment project
without completely compromising the interests of one, or a few,
stakeholders. Here, the tools are slightly adjusted from their original
purposes to adequately draw a parallel with the purpose of the land use
control tools of inclusionary zoning; that is, to construct or preserve
affordable housing. This Article calls for developers, municipalities and
communities to rethink how to plan for inclusion.
I. LAND USE CONTROLS, LAND ASSEMBLY & EXCLUSION

Part I draws parallels between exclusionary zoning and exclusionary
eminent domain by analogizing the exclusionary effects created by local
zoning powers and government takings powers in the United States.
10. See infra Part II.A (discussing the inclusionary zoning methods employed by state
legislatures).
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Eminent domain and zoning have overlapped as legal issues in what
courts call regulatory takings"1 when the exercise of zoning as a police
power rises to the level that is deemed near the equivalent of physically
divesting a person of his or her property.12 In Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
11. This refers to the Fifth Amendment prohibition that "nor shall private property be taken
for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V. For a discussion on
alternative perspectives of the Takings Clause, regulatory takings and just compensation, see
Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 64 (1964) (arguing that

compensation can prevent government takings from leading to discriminatory outcomes); see also
BRUCE ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION (1977) (examining takings and

compensation through various philosophical and legal perspectives); FRED BOSSELMAN ET AL.,
THE TAKING ISSUE 238 (1973) (recognizing that regulations have an economic impact on people
that need to be addressed); ROBERT C. ELLICKSON & VICKI L. BEEN, LAND USE CONTROLS:

CASES AND MATERIALS 149 (2005) (discussing compensation as an internalization of regulatory
costs); RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT
DOMAIN (1985) (examining the Takings Clause in light of the relationship between the individual
and the state); WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND POLITICS
(1995) (seeking a middle ground between deferring to unfair regulations that burden property
owners and imposing compensation for every infringement); John F. Hart, Colonial Land Use
Law and Its Significancefor Modern Takings Doctrine, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1252, 1256 (1996)

(highlighting legislation that requires payment of compensation to landowners when the
government reduces the market value of property by more than 20% by restricting the use of
land); Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundationsof "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967) (recognizing that the
attempt to formulate rules of decision for just compensation has yielded unsatisfying results);
William Michael Treanor, The Original Understandingof the Takings Clause and the Political
Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782 (1995) (arguing for a new theory of the Takings Clause under
which compensation is only required in cases where there has been singling out or where there

has been discrimination against discrete and insular minorities).
12. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 548 (2005) (holding that a plaintiff cannot
show a regulation is a taking by arguing that the regulation does not substantially advance a
government interest); Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 632 (2001) (finding that a
regulation prohibiting the construction of a beach club development on an owner's land did not
constitute a total taking because the land retained significant worth for the construction of a
residence); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 394-96 (1994) (concluding that requiring a
petitioner to dedicate part of her land for city use in order to expand her store was an
uncompensated taking); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1018 (1992) (holding that
barring a landowner from constructing habitable structures on his land after he purchased it can
constitute a taking because it denies the landowner access to an economically viable use of his
land); First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Cnty. of L.A., 482 U.S. 304, 321 (1987)
(holding that when a government's actions constitute a temporary taking, the government must

provide compensation for the period in which the taking was effective); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal
Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987) (finding that conditioning a permit to expand property on the
landowner allowing a public easement on that property is a taking if the land-use regulation does
not serve public purposes related to the permit requirement); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan
CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 441 (1982) (holding that a statute allowing a cable company to place
permanent cable facilities on a landowner's property is a taking because it constitutes a
permanent physical occupation); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 261-62 (1980) (finding
that placing landowners' property in a zone that forbids multiple family dwellings is not a taking
because it substantially advances a legitimate government goal, does not prevent the best use of
the landowners' land and does not extinguish a fundamental attribute of ownership); Penn Cent.
Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 136-37 (1978) (holding that designating
landowners' train station a historical landmark is not a taking because it does not interfere with
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Mahon, Justice Holmes noted this issue stating, the "general rule at least
is that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation
goes too far it will be recognized as a taking."' 3 Mahon has garnered
significant controversy over whether the Court's decision is a proper
foundation for modern day regulatory takings.1 4 Courts today require
an "essential nexus" 15 and "rough proportionality" when the state
approves a development based on its dedication for the public purpose
(or public use).16 These are long-standing judicial positions on
regulatory takings that view the use or abuse of a taking as exclusionary
by definition. Indeed, one viable claim against eminent domain takings
for private development is under the Equal Protection Clause, however
it is rarely applied and poses historical and theoretical problems.' 7
Regardless, the operation of regulatory takings excludes owners of
property-rightfully or not-and this fact is nothing new to the
regulatory takings debate. However, eminent domain and zoning have
rarely, if ever, been analogized in the context of affordable housing.
Scholars have argued at length the usefulness and limitations of
inclusionary housing programs to remedy exclusionary zoning.' 8 In
the land's present use nor does it prevent the landowner from realizing a reasonable return on
investment); Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922) (holding that determining whether
a regulation constitutes a taking is a question of degree); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394,
409-10 (1915) (concluding that forbidding a landowner from making bricks on his property does
not constitute a taking).
13. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415; see also id. at 413 ("When [regulation] reaches a certain
magnitude, in most if not in all cases there must be an exercise of eminent domain."). The
Mahon opinion, however, explains that a regulation is a taking when it denies the landowner the
ability to pursue all economically viable, beneficial, productive or feasible uses of his or her land.
Id. at 415-16. The regulation must also have significant impact on the landowner's investmentbacked expectations and must substantially advance legitimate state interests. Id.
14. See Robert Brauneis, "The Foundationof Our 'Regulatory Takings' Jurisprudence": The
Myth and Meaning of Justice Holmes's Opinion in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 106 YALE

L.J. 613, 702 (1996) (arguing that Mahon has left courts with very little framework for deciding
constitutional property rights cases); see also Frank Michelman, Takings, 1987, 88 COLUM. L.
REV. 1600, 1625 (1988) (arguing some takings cases "are a manifestation of the difficulties faced
by the Court in trying to keep faith with American constitutionalism's aspiration to reconcile
private property (or, more generally, limited government) with democracy"); William Michael
Treanor, Jamfor Justice Holmes: Reassessing the Signficance of Mahon, 86 GEO. L.J. 813, 861

(1998) (analyzing how Mahon became central to takings law).
15.

Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837.

16. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391.
17. Nestor M. Davidson, The Problem ofEquality in Takings, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. 1,5 (2008)
(arguing Takings Clause emphasis on protecting property rights does not make it a remedy for
finding discriminatory use).
18. For a comprehensive discussion of inclusionary zoning, see ANTHONY DowNs, OPENING
UP THE SUBURBS: AN URBAN STRATEGY FOR AMERICA 219 (1973) (showing how the unjust

aspects of urban development can be remedied); Lawrence Berger, InclusionaryZoning Devices
as Takings: The Legacy of the Mount Laurel Cases, 70 NEB. L. REV. 186 (1991) (examining

whether the Mount Laurel decisions are examples of judicial overreach attempting to end
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contrast to the heated debate over zoning, the argument for inclusionary
housing schemes to remedy exclusion and displacement by eminent
domain has rarely been suggested in academic literature, contemplated
by the courts or considered by municipalities or state legislatures.
Likewise, courts have rarely been pushed to consider the effects of
eminent domain on the loss of affordable housing when deciding
whether to grant municipalities the power and private developers the
benefit of eminent domain. In fact, the historic framework of eminent
domain analysis by the courts has rarely, if ever, suggested normative
content to the public use takings doctrine. The Supreme Court, and
many federal and state courts, have repeatedly followed the modem day
takings doctrine laid by Berman and continued by Kelo, electing to
defer takings challenges to the legislative process.
A consideration of the history, usefulness and limitations of
exclusionary zoning will help begin unpacking this new paradigm.
A. Exclusionary Zoning

1. Urban Sprawl and Exclusion
In the 1950s, urban sprawl created low-density and land-consuming
developments on the fringe of the inner cities and pushed land use
outward into rural and undeveloped areas that were in relatively close
proximity to a deteriorating inner city. 19 The phenomenon left behind

economic segregation in housing); Paul Davidoff & Linda Davidoff, Opening the Suburbs:
Toward Inclusionary Land Use Controls, 22 SYRACUSE L. REV. 509 (1971) (arguing that the

standard governing zoning and land use control should be one of inclusion); Charles E. Daye,
Whither "Fair" Housing: Meditations on Wrong Paradigms, Ambivalent Answers, and a

Legislative Proposal, 3 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 241 (2000) (identifying how to legislatively
correct the inadequacies of suburban exclusion and inclusion policies); Robert C. Ellickson, The
Irony of "Inclusionary" Zoning, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 1167 (1981) (arguing that inclusionary
zoning programs actually often increase general housing prices); Robert A. Johnston et al.,
Selling Zoning: Do Density Bonus Incentivesfor Moderate-CostHousing Work?, 36 WASH. U. J.

URB. & CONTEMP. L. 45 (1989) (analyzing the effectiveness of density bonuses and equivalent
financial incentives to projects that provide affordable housing); David S. King, Inclusionary
Zoning: Unfair Response to the Needfor Low Cost Housing, 4 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 597 (1982)

(reviewing the judicial and legislative approaches to resolving the affordable housing problem);
Thomas Kleven, Inclusionary Ordinances: Policy and Legal Issues in Requiring Private
Developers to Build Low Cost Housing, 21 UCLA L. REV. 1432 (1974) (examining the impact of

inclusionary ordinances on meeting housing needs); Laura M. Padilla, Reflections on
Inclusionary Housing and a Renewed Look at Its Viability, 23 HOFSTRA L. REV. 539 (1995)

(concluding that most inclusionary housing programs are viable and legally valid); Benjamin
Powell & Edward Stringham, "The Economics of Inclusionary Zoning Reclaimed": How

Effective Are Price Controls?, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 471 (2005) (determining that the economic
defense of inclusionary zoning is flawed).
19. Timothy J. Dowling, Reflections on Urban Sprawl, Smart Growth, and the Fifth

Amendment, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 873, 874 (2000).
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abandoned or underutilized property, contributing to the decline of
many American inner cities. 20 The scattering of suburban-bound
middle-class families also required significant development of new real
estate and services, which helped perpetuate white flight. 21 The
outward migration caused an inner-city exodus of working class
families to the suburbs, seeking refuge from the deteriorating "ghetto
underclass" conditions. 22
In response to the migration of low-income inner-city populations to
the suburbs, zoning laws were manipulated by local governments to
segregate and concentrate people within a locality-a practice called
exclusionary zoning. 23 As land was acquired and redeveloped in the
suburbs, local officials and zoning boards made decisions to regulate
and control the land density in accordance with desired local health,
safety and welfare standards. 24 The discriminatory nature of local
zoning codes veiled by these standards was difficult to detect in
constitutional challenges to a municipality's zoning code.
In Ambler Realty Co. v. Village of Euclid, the district court found

such land divisions, under the veil of comprehensive zoning,
unconstitutional because the land divisions classified and segregated the
population based on income. 25 The land divisions in Village of Euclid
became better known as Euclidean zoning. 26 The Euclidian technique
divided land into separate zones, essentially segregating the land by use
and building type. 27 The land could be zoned for purposes of singlefamily or multi-family residential housing, commercial property or light

20. Marc Seitles, The Perpetuationof Residential Racial Segregation in America: Historical
Discrimination, Modern Forms of Exclusion, and Inclusionary Remedies, 14 J. LAND USE &

ENVTL. L. 89, 101 (1998).
21.

Id. at 91.

22. See generally WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY,
THE UNDERCLASS AND PUBLIC POLICY (1987) (analyzing the effects of the exodus of working

class families from the inner city and the causes of social dislocation).
23. See Seitles, supra note 20, at 95-97.
24. Id. at 96.
25. Ambler Realty Co. v. Vill. of Euclid, 297 F.307, 316 (N.D. Ohio 1924), rev'd, 272 U.S.
365 (1926). Judge Westenhaver peeled away the discriminatory veil, exposing the unfair
exclusionary nature of zoning saying:
The plain truth is that the true object of the ordinance in question is to place all the
property in an undeveloped area of 16 square miles in a strait-jacket.. . . [T]he result to
be accomplished is to classify the population and segregate them according to their
income or situation in life.
Id.

26. See Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. (Euclid II), 272 U.S. at 387-89 (overturning the
district court decision, finding that nothing in the zoning code was arbitrary or capricious).
27. See Nicole Stelle Garnett, Ordering (and Order in) the City, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1, 4 (2004)

(discussing how Euclidean zoning reflects the preference for single-use zones).
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industrial. 28 The local government's exclusionary zoning code raised
the price and sale of residential property in a particular area to levels
that ensured that access to such property was denied to members along
social, economic and racial lines. 29
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court was the other court to hear the
early exclusionary zoning challenges. In National Land and Investment

Co. v. Easttown Township, the court found that zoning ordinances that
were designed purposely to exclude were unacceptable and in violation
of the state constitution. 30 The court, only five years later, again took
up the same issue. In In re Concord Township, the court held that
minimum lot sizes of two acres and three acres in the interior of a
proposed 140-acre development were unnecessarily large, particularly
for the construction of a house. 31 Thus, public regulation of the lot sizes
was found both unnecessary and "completely unreasonable." 32 Once
other courts began deciding cases on exclusionary zoning, such
practices became all but facially discriminatory. 33
Indeed, the expansive land reach of zoning in suburbs ultimately
inflated the price of housing and segregated low-income residents28. Id. at 22. See generally Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 541 (2005) (holding
a Euclid zoning ordinance will "survive a substantive due process challenge so long as it was not
'clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health, safety,
morals, or general welfare' (emphasis in original) (citation omitted)).

29. See Sager, supra note 2, at 767 (discussing how exclusionary zoning results in the denial
of residential access to members of low-income groups). See generally STEPHEN R. SEIDEL,
HOUSING COSTS & GOVERNMENT 159-86 (1978) (discussing the history, goals and impacts of
zoning); David E. Dowall, The Effect of Land Use and Environmental Regulations on Housing

Costs, 8 POL'Y STUD. J. 277 (1979) (analyzing the effects of land use and environmental
regulations on housing costs).
30. Nat'l Land & Inv. Co. v. Bd. of Adjustment of Easttown Twp., 215 A.2d 597, 612-13 (Pa.
1965). The court went on to hold that "[z]oning provisions may not be used, however, to avoid
the increased responsibilities and economic burdens which time and natural growth invariably
bring." Id. at 610.
31. In re Concord Twp., 268 A.2d 765, 767 (Pa. 1970).
32. Id. at 767.
33. See, e.g., United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1186 (8th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975) (finding that a city ordinance prohibiting the construction of any
new multiple family housing was a prima facie violation of the Fair Housing Act of 1968 because
of its racial implications); Ybarra v. Town of Los Altos Hills, 503 F.2d 250, 254 (9th Cir. 1974)
(recognizing that a large-lot zoning ordinance prevented Mexican-American appellants from
living in the town because of their poverty); Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Twp. of Madison, 371
A.2d 1192, 1208 (N.J. 1977) (holding that zoning ordinances under which persons in the bottom
third of the population had no access to housing are impermissible); Surrick v. Zoning Hearing
Bd., 476 382 A.2d 105, 111-12 (Pa. 1977) (finding that a zoning ordinance allowing only 1.14%
of land for the development of multi-family dwellings was impermissible); In re Girsh, 263 A.2d
395, 400 (Pa. 1970) (holding that a zoning ordinance, although it did not prohibit all apartments,
was not permissible because it set aside too small of an area for apartments for the size of the
population).
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many of whom were people of color-by socio-economic
characteristics. 34 The resulting property tax rates differed between
wealthier and poorer residential areas because the zoning codes tied
multi-family housing prices to single-family housing prices, 35 therefore
implicitly segregating the tax base of the municipality into separated
parcels of land. Redlining was already one form of segregation that
prevented certain groups from migrating and living in predominantly
white neighborhoods. 36 Euclidian zoning would later help perpetuate
suburban sprawl and exacerbate segregation in America.
2. Exclusionary Zoning Doctrine
However, unlike Pennsylvania, some state courts, such as those in
New Jersey, took a more progressive approach to zoning standards that
veiled discriminatory actions.
The result was an increase in
constitutional challenges to exclusionary zoning under the Equal
Protection Clause, and not the Takings Clause, that forced courts to look
narrowly at a zoning code's intended purposes, an approach called
exclusionary zoning doctrine. In the 1970s several courts in New Jersey
found that "practically any significant kind of zoning" had inherent
socio-economic characteristics. 37 The Mt. Laurel saga 38 unveiled
34. See ROBERT ELLICKSON & A. TARLOCK, LAND-USE CONTROLS 795-859 (1981).
35. Multifamily Housing Financeand Production:Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Hous. &
Cmty. Dev. of the H Comm. on Banking, Fin. & UrbanAffairs, 102d Cong. 36 (1992) (statement

of William C. Perkins, Board of Directors, Federal Housing Finance Board) (noting that
affordable housing stock declined from 8.6 million units in 1974 to six million units in 1989).
36. See DOUGLASS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION
AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 10 (1993). Massey and Denton challenge William Julius
Wilson's "black-out migration theory" by positing the theory of "hypersegregation," the "welldefined institutional practices, private behaviors, and public policies by which whites sought to
contain growing urban black populations," including redlining, among other tactics, that
perpetuated the concentration of poor blacks in the inner city. Id. For later studies on this topic,
see XAVIER DE SOUZA BRIGGS, THE GEOGRAPHY OF OPPORTUNITY: RACE AND HOUSING
CHOICE IN METROPOLITAN AMERICA (2005); see also KARYN R. LACY, BLUE CHIP BLACK:
RACE, CLASS AND STATUS INTHE NEW BLACK MIDDLE CLASS (2007) (focusing on the impact of

differences in residential location on the construction of identity for middle-class AfricanAmericans). See generally ROBERT J. SAMPSON, GREAT AMERICAN CITY: CHICAGO AND THE
ENDURING NEIGHBORHOOD EFFECT 20-30 (2012) (theorizing that there is a social component to

enduring neighborhood inequality in that people react to neighborhood difference).
37. S. Burlington Cnty. NAACP v. Twp. of Mount Laurel (Mt. Laurel II), 456 A.2d 390, 449
(N.J. 1983) (hearing and deciding six cases together concerning towns' obligations under the
Mount Laurel doctrine).
38. The term "saga" is used to illuminate the length and importance of the case. This is
simply an author preference, which I have used elsewhere in other scholarship. See Gerald S.
Dickinson, Blue Moonlight Rising: Evictions, Alternative Accommodation and a Comparative
Perspective on Affordable Housing Solutions in Johannesburg,27 S. AFR. J. ON HUM. RTS. 466,
473 (2011) [hereinafter Dickinson, Blue Moonlight Rising]; Gerald S. Dickinson, The Blue
Moonlight Remedy: Formulatingthe Voucher Scheme into a New Emergency Housing Remedy in
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exclusionary zoning codes that discriminated based on opaque and
vague standards such as codes that sought to achieve the health, safety,
morals or general welfare of the residents and were all held
unconstitutional on equal protection grounds. 39
Exclusionary zoning doctrine, originating from the Mt. Laurel
Doctrine, 40 essentially provided that a local municipality's fair share
obligation is presumptive. If the plaintiffs (usually low-income
households) make a prima facie case of exclusion, the burden then shifts
to the municipality to prove otherwise. 41 The Mt. Laurel Doctrine also
imposes an obligation on the municipality to plan for the inclusion of
low-income rental units in cooperation with private developers.
Similar constitutional challenges were employed, with less success,

in other notable cases such as Berenson v. Town of New Castle42 and
Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas.43 And finally, the U.S. Supreme Court
met its Euclidian match in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan
Housing Development Corp.4 4 But in one of the lesser-quoted excerpts

from the Mt. Laurel saga, the court, in one line, captured the essence of
where affordable housing policy was heading, stating that "Courts do
not build housing nor do municipalities." 45 Indeed, in an increasingly
deregulated housing market in the aftermath of the public housing
demise, states were seeking ways to build housing through the private

South Africa, 130 S. AFR. L.J. 554, 561 (2013) [hereinafter Dickinson, The Blue Moonlight
Remedy].

39. See S. Burlington Cnty. NAACP v. Twp. of Mount Laurel (Mt. Laurel 1), 336 A.2d 713,
727-28 (N.J. 1975).
40. John M. Payne, Norman Williams, Exclusionary Zoning, and the Mount Laurel Doctrine:
Making the Theory Fit the Facts, 20 VT. L. REv. 665 (1995).

41. See Mt. Laurel 1, 336 A.2d at 728 (stating that if "a facial showing of violation of
substantive due process or equal protection under the state constitution has been made out [] the
burden" then "shifts to the municipality to establish a valid basis for its action or non-action").
42. Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 341 N.E.2d 236, 241 (N.Y. 1975) (finding that the
exclusion of multifamily housing under New Castle's zoning law was unconstitutional and
holding "[t]he primary goal of a zoning ordinance must be to provide for the development of a
balanced, cohesive community"). The town was required to change its zoning laws to provide a
fair share of various housing types that were marked at affordable market rates. Id at 243.
43. Vill. of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 2-3, 9 (1974) (approving town zoning
ordinance barring all uses other than owner-occupied single family residences within the
municipal borders).
44. Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977). The
challenge sought to halt the effects of decreased access to low- and moderate-income affordable
housing. See id at 270-71 n.21. But, lacking sufficient proof of intent to discriminate in the
city's refusal to rezone for purposes of constructing more affordable housing, the Court denied
the challenge to overturn the exclusionary ordinance. Id. at 270. The Court also reviewed the
racial discrimination claim, affirming that a showing of disproportionate impacts on particular
groups was insufficient to prove an equal protection violation. Id at 265-68.
45. See Mt. LaurelI,336 A.2d at 734.
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market, particularly in response to exclusionary zoning.
However, the abovementioned cases do not invoke the Holmesian
idea that regulations, particularly zoning codes, that go too far must
involve the exercise of eminent domain. The loss of affordable
housing-or exclusion of low-income housing in wealthier parts of a
locality-was confined mostly to the exercise of zoning that violated
the Equal Protection Clause. Eminent domain, like zoning, does have
the power to exclude under the veil of health, safety and morals, but
exercised under the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause. In fact, the
history of takings has resulted in a similar ubiquitous land use problem.
Nevertheless, the practice of exclusion in the eminent domain context
is, primarily, exercised by forcefully taking and assembling the land, not
opaquely regulating and controlling the land.
B. ExclusionaryEminent Domain

The phenomenon of "exclusionary eminent domain," coined by
David Dana, occurs when a taking leads to the loss of affordable
housing and the displacement of residents from one neighborhood to
another.46 More than just this, though, it is analogous to exclusionary
zoning in that the condemnation that results excludes low-income
households from an otherwise predominantly or entirely middle-class or
wealthy neighborhood or locality. 4 7 Dana notes that poor residents are
doubly excluded in eminent domain proceedings:
Exercises of what I am calling "exclusionary eminent domain" are
doubly exclusive because the displaced residents are unable to afford
new housing in the same neighborhood or locality as their nowcondemned, former homes. In exclusionary eminent domain, lowincomes households are excluded not only from their homes but also
from their home neighborhood or locality. 48
Exclusionary eminent domain occurs in two distinct contextssuburban and urban. 49 In the suburban context, dwellings or structures
occupied by low-income families may be condemned by the
municipality for purposes of attracting new development, drawing in

46. See Dana, supra note 5, at 8.
47. See id; see also Matthew J. Parlow, Unintended Consequences: Eminent Domain and
Affordable Housing, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 841, 856-57 (2006) ("[N]ot only do cities fail to

use their eminent domain power to build more affordable housing units, but they often use their
power to raze them .... By taking such affordable housing units off the market by their exercise
of eminent domain power, cities reduce the available housing stock for low-income residents as
such units are usually replaced by new high-end commercial, residential, and mixed-use
projects.").
48. Dana, supra note 5, at 8.
49. Id. at 8-9.

2014]

InclusionaryEminent Domain

859

residential and commercial property for the wealthy. 50 In the urban
context, a municipality of a large city condemns property in a gentrified
area. 51 The consequence in either context is displacement. Lowincome residents are forced to relocate to poorer areas of the city (in the
urban context) or to remote suburbs. 52
As a result of this exclusionary practice, residents (also known as the
renters or condemnees in eminent domain proceedings) do not receive
compensation for a peculiar, but not less important, loss under the
law. 53 In other words, the loss is the inability to remain in the
neighborhood the condemnee was displaced from. 54 Takings doctrine,
according to Dana, underprices low-income housing and produces an
inefficiently high level of condemnations of low-income households.55
The condemnee, as a result, bears the social costs of displacement.
Although Dana's definition of the exclusionary eminent domain
phenomenon is narrowed to the effects in gentrifying urban areas where
low-income owners and low-income tenants reside in relatively wealthy
to middle-class areas, the forthcoming discussion conceptualizes the
phenomenon, historically and more broadly, to include any form of
condemnation and eviction-whether for purposes of economic
redevelopment, urban renewal, urban regeneration, etc.-that decreases
the stock of and access to affordable housing in slums and other forms
of concentrated poverty-stricken neighborhoods.
1. Urban Redevelopment and Displacement
The municipal power to exercise eminent domain has a history of
displacing disproportionately poor populations.56 The exclusionary
50. Id. at 8.
51. See id. at 8-9.

52. Id at 9. In some jurisdictions, however, tenants do receive just compensation when the
landowner's property is condemned. Indeed, the tenant (also known as the lessee), not just the
landowner (or lessor), in such jurisdictions receives compensation based on the rental value over
the rent that is reserved. In other words, the tenant's projected loss from condemnation depends
on whether the rental value of the leasehold exceeds that of the rent reserved through the lease
term. Thus, Dana's analysis that "renters .. . have no meaningful property rights within our legal
framework" is loose and tenuous. Id. at 43.
53. Id. at 11.
54. Id
5 5. Id.
56. Wendell E. Pritchett, The "Public Menace" of Blight: Urban Renewal and the Private
Uses of Eminent Domain, 21 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 1 (2003). Wendell Pritchett describes the

exclusionary effects of eminent domain through urban renewal saying,
[B]light was often used to describe the negative impact of certain residents on city
neighborhoods ... [and] used to justify the removal of blacks and other minorities
from certain parts of the city. By selecting racially changing neighborhoods as
blighted areas and designating them for redevelopment, the urban renewal program
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effects of eminent domain were perhaps most glaring in New York City.
The "power broker" behind many of the urban renewal projects was
Robert Moses, who singlehandedly dispossessed tens of thousands of
poor people from their homes and businesses to make way for his grand
visions of a renewed urban environment. 57 Thus, Moses was able to
build silos for the poor and residential housing for the wealthy. 58
Indeed, slums and blighted areas were the havens for most of the
poor who were removed. Ironically, Moses was creating "new slums as
fast as [he was] clearing the old" contributing "to the ghettoization of
the city, dividing up the city by color and income." 59 The new,
substitute housing was usually not on the site where the urban renewal
project was taking place, but rather in remote locations on the outskirts
The housing was bleak and sterile, expressing
of the city. 60
"patronizing condescension." 6 1 The courts would later learn that the
meaning and interpretation behind condemnation-or appropriationcould be used to satisfy the means to destructive ends. 62
The Supreme Court, and subsequently other state and federal courts,

enabled institutional and political elites to relocate minority populations and entrench
racial segregation.
Id. at 6.
57. ROBERT A. CARO, THE POWER BROKER: ROBERT MOSES AND THE FALL OF NEW YORK

19-20 (Alfred A. Knopf ed., 1974) (unpacking the magnitude of the effects of eminent domain on
displacing thousands of people).
58. Id. at 20.
59. Id.
60. Id. ("[Tihere are available no accurate figures on the total number of people evicted from
their homes for all Robert Moses public works, but the figure is almost certainly close to half a
The dispossessed, barred from many areas of the city by their color and their
million ....
poverty, had no place to go but into the already overcrowded slums ....
61. Id.
62. In the 1920s, the New York State legislature understood "appropriation" to mean the
allocation of funds by the Legislature. See id. at 174 (referring to Chapter 122 of the Laws of
1924). However, Moses had read a very different, hidden meaning of "appropriation" in the
legislation. Significantly, in the context of land acquisition, the traditional use of the state's
authority to "appropriate" land was only for vast forest lands. Id. The power of condemnation by
"appropriation" of land had not, however, been used in urban or suburban contexts. Moses
discovered and re-interpreted an obscure law enacted by the New York legislature in 1884,
transferring the meaning of appropriation from the mountain and forest context to the urban and
suburban context. In the act, "appropriation" read as empowering the state to "appropriate" forest
lands and defined "appropriation" as a procedure in which a state official could take possession of
the land by simply walking on it, leaving the possessor of land with only a glimmer of hope of
compensation by applying to the condemnation commission. Id. Title I of the United States
Housing Act of 1949 amplified the "appropriation" power and gave the state authority to exercise
eminent domain by condemning land and giving it to developers to build and construct. Title I
therefore allowed for the condemnation of almost any urban land within a city, and its evicted
residents became victims of demolished buildings, only for the land to be handed to public and
private developers. Id. at 777.
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finally entered the conversation over the constitutionality of the power
of eminent domain for urban renewal projects and economic
redevelopment projects where the land was transferred from the state to
a private entity and later, from a private entity to a private entity. This
issue came to a head in Berman v. Parker63-the seminal case laying
the prevailing foundation of takings doctrine that interprets the words
"public use" as coterminous with "public purpose" when exercised for
purposes of blight removal or economic redevelopment. 64
In Berman, the District of Columbia Redevelopment Land Agency
was given the power to undertake the redevelopment of blighted
territory by way of prevention, reduction or elimination of slums or
areas that produce slums. Area B, located in southwest Washington,
D.C. was a decaying and blighted area of residential housing. 65 But the
"mere fact that a community occupied the proposed site for
redevelopment was not factored into the eminent domain
proceedings." 66 The community was not a primary factor in choosing a
method of renewal, such as whether to physically destroy the area,
thereby dispersing the community, or rehabilitating and restoring the
area. 67 By displacing the residents in the slums, the eminent domain
proceedings offered few alternative accommodations for the-albeit
inferior-existing affordable housing. 68
Section 6(b) of the District of Columbia Redevelopment Act of 1945
("DCRA") required a redevelopment project (granted through the use of
eminent domain and approved by the municipality commissioner) to
have a provision that considered "the amount or character or class of
any low-rent housing." 69 The Court focused on section 2 of the
DCRA. 70 But, the municipality's plans for economic redevelopment

63. See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 34 (1954) (examining redevelopment for public
purposes).
64. See id (stating that if a community is to be healthy, it cannot revert to being a blighted
area).
65. Id. at 30.
66. Keasha Broussard, Social Consequences of Eminent Domain: Urban Revitalization
Against the Backdrop ofthe Takings Clause, 24 LAW & PSYCHOL. REv. 99, 105 (2000).
67. Denis J. Brion, The Meaning of the City: Urban Redevelopment and the Loss of the

Community, 25 IND. L. REv. 685, 702 (1991).
68. However, to convince the Court that the taking was justified for economic redevelopment
purposes, the municipality proposed construction of affordable housing for the poor. See
Berman, 348 U.S. at 30-31 (noting "[tihe plan for Area B . .. makes detailed provisions for types
of dwelling units and provides that at least one-third of them are to be low-rent housing with a
maximum rental of $17 per room per month").
69. District of Columbia Redevelopment Act of 1945, ch. 736, § 6(b), 60 Stat. 790, 794
(1946).
70. See Berman, 348 U.S. at 28 (focusing on the statutory language stating that "'the
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fell short of its original intent to substitute the existing blighted housing
with new affordable housing developments. 71 Instead, the development
plans for Area B changed after the Supreme Court granted the
municipality the authority to condemn and the planned affordable
housing developments were never fully realized. 72 Berman set the stage
for nearly sixty years of takings doctrine precedent.
Poletown Neighborhood Council v. Detroit, Hawaii Housing
Authority v. Midkiff' and Kelo v. City of New London followed
Berman's public use definition as taking anything that is "broad and
inclusive," including any "object ... within the authority of
Congress." 73 The growing eminent domain jurisprudence essentially
washed away the meaning of the public use limitation in the
Constitution. Kelo then sparked a lengthy debate amongst the public,
jurists, policymakers and academics over what was meant by rendering
economic redevelopment takings for public use. 74

conditions ... are injurious to the public health, safety, morals, and welfare; and it is hereby
declared to be the policy of the United States to protect and promote the welfare of the inhabitants
of the seat of the Government by eliminating all such injurious conditions by employing all
means necessary and appropriatefor the purpose.' (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted)).
The Court further noted section 3(r)'s definition of substandard housing conditions: "dwelling ...
or housing accommodation for human beings, which because of lack of sanitary facilities,
ventilation, or light, or because of dilapidation, overcrowding, faulty interior arrangement, or any
combination of these factors, is in the opinion of Commissioners detrimental to the safety, health,
morals, or welfare of the inhabitants of the District of Columbia." Id. at 28 n.l (emphasis added).
The Court acknowledged that many residents would be affected by the redevelopment project.
See id. at 30 ("The population of Area B amounted to 5,012 persons, of whom 97.5% were
Negroes.").
71. Audrey G. McFarlane, The New Inner City: Class Transformation, Concentrated
Affluence and the Obligations of the Police Power, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 50 (2006) ("The
Berman [C]ourt's approval of the exercise of police power thus implicitly rested on the plan's
provision for socio-economic variety and inclusion, most importantly of the poor. Ironically, the
implementation of the urban renewal program did not look anything like what was presented to
the Court.").
72. Id. at 51.

73. Berman, 348 U.S. at 33; see Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 483 (2005)
(stating that the Court's "public use jurisprudence has wisely eschewed rigid formulas and
intensive scrutiny in favor of affording legislatures broad latitude in determining what public
needs justify the use of the takings power"); see also Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229,
240-41 (1984) (holding that economic development qualified as public use under the federal and
state constitutions and holding that courts will not stop a taking as long as the use of eminent
domain is rationally related to some conceivable public purpose); Poletown Neighborhood
Council v. Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455, 459 (Mich. 1981) (determining that redevelopment was for
economic development purposes-the public benefit-and valid as public use even if the only
claimed public benefit was a bolstered economy).
74. See, e.g., ROBERT G. DREHER & JOHN D. ECHEVERRIA, KELO's UNANSWERED
QUESTIONS: THE POLICY DEBATE OVER THE USE OF EMINENT DOMAIN FOR ECONOMIC

DEVELOPMENT 1 (2006) (stating that the use of eminent domain for economic development raises
concerns that government power may be used to benefit private interests).
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However, noteworthy is County of Wayne v. Hathcock, where the
Michigan Supreme Court reversed Poletown, holding that "generalized
economic benefit" is not enough to justify condemnation. 75 Hathcock
was a reprieve for many still trying, one year later, to wrap their heads
around the powerful exercise of state authority that Kelo seemed to
exhibit. While some argued that there was a legitimate public outcry
over Kelo because middle-income homes were being displaced, the
same reasoning for granting the municipality the power to exercise
eminent domain in the District of Columbia sixty years earlier was the
controlling doctrine used in Berman. The difference, however, was
Kelo was an attack on America's middle class while Berman had an
impact on poor minority communities and thus received far less media
attention.
The main thrust of the problem in the abovementioned cases was the
extent to which the state could exercise eminent domain for public or
private purposes. However, courts have yet to rule on eminent domain
challenges based on whether the taking would have an impact on
affordable housing. But perhaps the dissents from Justice Thomas and
Justice O'Connor laid the groundwork for such reasoning. 76
Today, the exclusionary effects of eminent domain still resonate in
high-density urban environments.
The ongoing Atlantic Yards
redevelopment saga in Brooklyn, New York is perhaps the most recent
example of the phenomenon of exclusionary eminent domain where
low-income and middle-income residents are displaced in an
increasingly gentrified dense urban area. 77
The Empire State Development Corporation ("ESDC"), a quasigovernmental organization, sought to condemn property in Prospect
Heights, which then allowed New York City to officially condemn the
land as blighted and in need of redevelopment. The area was subject to

75. Cnty. of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765, 786 (Mich. 2004).
76. Justices Clarence Thomas and Sandra Day O'Connor focused their Kelo dissents on the
impact that eminent domain has on low-income minority communities. Justice Thomas noted,
"[a]llowing the government to take property solely for public purposes is bad enough, but
extending the concept of public purpose to encompass any economically beneficial goal
guarantees that these losses will fall disproportionately on poor communities." See Kelo, 545
U.S. at 521 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
77. It worth noting in the discussion of Atlantic Yards, including Goldstein v. N. Y State
Urban Development Corp. (Goldstein), 921 N.E.2d 164 (N.Y. 2009), that Daniel Goldstein was

the final landowner to hold out before the eminent domain proceeding commenced and the
property was confiscated for redevelopment. Goldstein, however, was a relatively affluent
professional who was displaced by the redevelopment project. Thus, exclusionary eminent
domain increasingly impacts low-income and middle-class residents.
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gentrification for years78 before the courts of New York confronted the
borough's biggest redevelopment project. 79 Low-income tenants
argued they were the "hardest hit," losing rent-stabilized apartments and
other affordable housing that was not replaced.80 Furthermore,
opponents charged that they would be excluded not only from their
homes but also from their home neighborhoods or localities in
Brooklyn. 81 Thus, a challenge arose and the courts intervened. 82
In Goldstein v. New

York State Urban Development Corp.

("Goldstein"),83 the Court of Appeals of New York upheld ESDC's use
of eminent domain to acquire land for the Atlantic Yards project in
Brooklyn.
The court deferred the decision-making process of
determining blight 84 to ESDC. 85

78. Iver Peterson, Prospect Heights Beginning to Climb to Gentrification, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.

27, 1988; see also James E. Caldwell, President's Testimony at the New York City Council
Economic Development Committee Hearing, Brooklyn United for Innovative Local Development
(BUILD) (May 4, 2004). White flight from urban areas in the 40s, 50s and 60s was followed by
disinvestment from the inner cities, such as Brooklyn. The disinvestment deprived many in
search of economic opportunities of prosperity and imprisoned many in the clutches of working
class poverty and underclass entrapment. Id
79. See PRATT INST. CTR. FOR CMTY. & ECON. DEV., SLAM DUNK OR AIRBALL? A
PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF THE ATLANTIC YARDS PROJECT 1 (Mar. 2005) (explaining that, in

2000, approximately 65% of the households in the area earned more than the median income for
Brooklyn, compared to 45% in 1990); see also DEV. DON'T DESTROY BROOKLYN, RESPONSE TO
THE ATLANTIC YARDS ARENA AND REDEVELOPMENT PROJECT BLIGHT STUDY CONTAINED

WITHIN THE GENERAL PROJECT PLAN 4 (Sept. 26, 2006) (stating Brooklyn's real estate market in
2006 was drastically different than its real estate market in 1968).

80. See generally Brief for Develop Don't Destroy (Brooklyn), Inc. et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioners, Kelo, 545 U.S. 469 (No. 04-108).
8 1. Id.
82. See Goldstein v. Pataki, 516 F.3d 50, 53 (2d Cir. 2008) (upholding the district court's
dismissal of a complaint lodged by fifteen property owners whose homes and businesses were to

be condemned by the Atlantic Yards project and the pending construction of affordable housing).
The ESDC's taking for public use was determined valid under the Fifth Amendment. Id at 59.
The court said the Atlantic Yards project, which involved the redevelopment of blighted area, the
creation of affordable housing, the creation of public open space and other mass-transit
improvements, was rationally related to public use and that the ESDC, deputized by the
legislature, could determine what was public use based on its study and analysis of the land in
Prospect Heights. Id at 58-59; see also Dev. Don't Destroy (Brooklyn) v. Urban Dev. Corp., 59
A.D.3d 312, 333 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009) (ruling in favor of the ESDC's environmental impact
statement). The courts were now relying on the environmental impact statements and blight
studies to determine whether blight rose to a level that granted the ESDC the power to seize the
land, exercise eminent domain and hand over the responsibility of redevelopment to Forest City

Ratner Companies LLC ("FCR"), the private development company. See Dev. Don't Destroy, 59
A.D.3d at 423 (deferring to the ESDC's blight study to determine there was blight in the takings
area).
83. Goldstein, 921 N.E.2d 164 (N.Y. 2009).
84. Conditions that rise to the level of blight usually include high crime, high unemployment
rates, declining tax bases, dilapidated buildings and infrastructure, buildings that violate building
codes and high vacancy rates for commercial, residential or office buildings. These conditions
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The language of article 1, section 7 of the New York Constitution is
similar to the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause. It requires both public
use and just compensation for a state taking of private property. 86 Like
Berman, a "broad and inclusive" definition of what constitutes
permissible public use or public purpose was adopted in New York. 87
Significantly, the taking of land for slum clearance purposes is
constitutionally accepted and falls under the public use requirement.88
Moreover, under article 18, section 6, takings for the purpose of slum
clearance and economic redevelopment must provide low-income
housing if the project is subsidized or funded in some capacity by the
state. 89
Like Berman, the construction of affordable housing was a
substantial justification for the Atlantic Yards redevelopment project. 90
and definitions vary by state.
85. Id. at 171-72 (discussing standard for upholding a public benefit corporation's finding of
blight).
86. N.Y. CONST. ANN. art. I, § 7. The provision was enacted in 1821 and was amended over
the years to allow condemnations for private roads (in 1846) and for swamp drainage systems (in
1894). Id.
87. See, e.g., Bd. of Hudson River Regulating Dist. v. Fonda, Johnstown & Gloversville R.R.
Co., 164 N.E. 541, 543 (N.Y. 1928) (rejecting a claim that a dam, claimed to be needed for flood
control purposes, was actually intended to benefit private power producers; even if there was a
profit motive, the public use was sufficient); Holmes Elec. Protective Co. v. Williams, 127 N.E.
315, 320 (N.Y. 1920) (Andrews, J., concurring) (upholding taking for telegraph company).
88. N.Y. CONST. art. XVIII, § 9. Although the amendment expressly authorized the use of
eminent domain for slum clearance purposes, it did not modify article 1,section 7, suggesting that
slum clearance, in some cases, might still be found to be a private use. Murray v. La Guardia, 52
N.E.2d 884, 887-88 (N.Y. 1943) (finding slum clearance a public use).
89. N.Y. CONST. art. XVIII, § 6. The critical state constitutional provision used throughout
Goldstein was ultimately shelved when the petitioners failed to make a persuasive case under
article XVIII, section 6. The New York constitutional provision states that "[tihe occupancy of
any such project shall be restricted to persons of low income as defined by law and preference
shall be given to persons who live or shall have lived in such area or areas." Id. Under the plain
language interpretation any housing built as part of the Atlantic Yards project, which received
some state loans or subsidies, would be reserved for low-income tenants. See id.
90. See Brief for Petitioners-Appellants at 68, Goldstein, 921 N.E.2d 164 (N.Y. 2009) (No.
2009-0178) (arguing that applying the plain language of article XVIII, section 6 of the New York
State Constitution to the Atlantic Yards project would not produce absurd results, nor would it
place unwarranted burdens on the developer); see also Coal. for Responsible Planning v. Koch,
535 N.Y.S.2d 513, 519 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1988) (allowing plans for construction of housing to
proceed after applying New York Private Housing Law and determining that "low-income" group
is not required to have particular lower monetary income level); Chelcy v. Buffalo Mun. Hous.
Auth., 206 N.Y.S.2d 158, 161 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1960) (applying article XVIII, section 6 of the New
York State Constitution to state-aided public housing development); Minkin v. City of N.Y., 198
N.Y.S.2d 744, 749-50 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1960) (denying injunction to prevent taking-although the
property to be taken would benefit "middle-income" group-because, pursuant to article XVIII,
the legislature adopted a broad standard for income status); Davidson v. City of Elmira, 44
N.Y.S.2d 302, 311-12 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1943) (dismissing action to enjoin public housing authority
from engaging in a housing project). But see Goldstein, 921 N.E.2d at 184 (determining that the
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The petitioners, however, argued that the respondent's proposed
affordable housing was not actually "affordable" for low-income
persons. 91 Instead "the majority of the housing units in the economic
redevelopment project [were] slated to be rented or sold at market
rates." 9 2 The petitioners pointed to article 18, section 6, arguing that
although the land use improvement project received state aid earmarked
for affordable housing, the project did not comply with the state
constitution, 93 and the respondent's Modified General Project Plan
suggested that affordable housing could never be constructed at the
site.94
The court dismissed such claims, stating that the argument "does not
capture the provision's [(article 18, section 6)] intendment." 95 The
court explained that slum clearance and the construction of affordable
housing were "not under the article necessarily, or even ordinarily, to be
pursued in tandem." 96 Instead, it held the constitutional provision,
approved in the 1930s, was intended to deal with the growth of slums. 97
If a municipality exercised the power to condemn emerging slums, then
it was required that affordable housing be constructed. 98 The court
concluded, "The sentence in essence assures that if housing is created in
connection with a slum clearance project, and the project is aided by
state loans or subsidies, the new housing will replace the low rent
accommodations lost during the clearance." 99 The court's reasoning
follows Berman and Kelo, ensuring that municipalities are not
constitutionally obligated to build affordable housing when exercising

core purpose of the Atlantic Yards project was not to develop affordable housing but rather to
rehabilitate substandard land through improvements, including the construction of a sports arena,
publicly-accessible open space, and community facilities).
91. Brief for Petitioners-Appellants, supra note 90, at 14.
92. Goldstein, 921 N.E.2d at 174.
93. Brief for Petitioners-Appellants, supra note 90, at 68.
94. See Brief for Respondents-Appellees at 24, Goldstein, 921 N.E.2d 164 (No. 2009-0178)
(noting the Blight Study documented the presence of conditions that purportedly made it highly
unlikely that the blight would be removed without public action).
95. Goldstein, 921 N.E.2d at 174. Significantly, the court clarified the language of the
constitutional provision, saying the section 6 clause, "assures that if housing is created in
connection with a slum clearance project, and the project is aided by state loans or subsidies, the
new housing will replace the low rent accommodations lost during the clearance." Id at 175.
The court concluded that although building affordable housing to replace lost housing is a worthy
objective, it is not constitutionally required under article XVIII, saying that "to hold otherwise
would in many cases arbitrarily tether land use improvement to the creation of low rent housing
and, in so doing, encumber, in a manner plainly without the framers' contemplation." Id
96. Id. at 174.
97. Id.
98. Id at 174-75.
99. Id. at 175 (emphasis added).
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eminent domain. What was left of the Atlantic Yards saga was a lesser
publicized component-a history-making community benefits
agreement that serves as the seminal tool for how inclusionary eminent
domain operates conceptually and practically.oo
Even amidst longstanding case law and federal legislation,101 the

100. See infra Parts IIB.1, I.A (discussing how the CBA from the Atlantic Yards project
could serve as a model for community leverage under inclusionary eminent domain).
101. Housing Act of 1949, ch. 338, 63 Stat. 413 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
12 and 42 U.S.C.) (relating to the Urban Renewal Fund, which was terminated by 42 U.S.C. §
5316 after Jan. 1 1975). Federal legislation has attempted to combat the displacement of
communities from condemnation. Id. The Housing Act of 1949 was enacted to provide
temporary relocation payments for people displaced by federal urban renewal programs. Id The
Fair Compensation Act ("FCA") was enacted to standardize relocation assistance legislation
along with the Housing Act of 1949. SELECT SUBCOMM. ON REAL PROP. ACQUISITION OF THE
HOUSE COMM. ON PUB. WORKS, 88TH CONG., STUDY OF COMPENSATION AND ASSISTANCE FOR
PERSON AFFECTED BY REAL PROPERTY AND ACQUISITION IN FEDERAL AND FEDERALLY

ASSISTED PROGRAM 145-47 (Comm. Print 1965). The Act sought to afford "persons affected by

the acquisition of real property in ... federally assisted programs ... fair and equitable treatment
on a basis as nearly uniform as practicable." Id. at 147. In particular, two prominent pieces of
federal legislation have sought to mitigate the displacement effects on low-income communities
when eminent domain and other land use mechanisms are exercised-the Uniform Relocation
Assistance Act ("URA") and the Housing and Urban Development Act ("UDA"). See Housing
and Urban Development Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-117, 79 Stat. 451 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 12 and 42 U.S.C.); Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property
Acquisition Policies Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-646, 84 Stat. 1894 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 4601-4655); see also NAT'L. HOUS. & ECON. DEV. LAW PROJECT, Guide to Federal
Housing Redevelopment and PlanningPrograms, in HANDBOOK ON HOUSING LAW ch. X, pts. 1-

13 (1970) (discussing relocation obligations imposed by URA on federally funded highway
projects that cause displacement). The URA specifically incorporated many of the goals of the
Housing Act and FCA and was a remedy for the growing social problems in urban areas and to
alleviate hardship for the poor. See NAT'L. HOUS. & ECON. DEV. LAW PROJECT, supra, ch. X,

pts. 1-13 (reporting that URA requires more than the Highway Relocation Assistance Act of
1968 from federally assisted projects in terms of relocation planning for displacees). The URA
was meant to ensure adequate replacement housing to individuals displaced by federally funded
activities. See 42 U.S.C. § 4621 (2012) ("This subchapter establishes a uniform policy for the fair
and equitable treatment of persons displaced as a direct result of programs or projects undertaken
by a Federal agency or with Federal financial assistance."). Significantly, the Act targeted lowincome communities who were disproportionately affected by displacement and subsequently
experience serious affordable housing shortages. See H.R. Doc. No. 91-34, pt. 2, at 82-83 (1968)
(reporting that urban renewal programs between 1949 and 1968 actually resulted in a net deficit
between the number of low-income housing units directly destroyed and the number built for the
poor); see also 42 U.S.C. § 4625(c) (describing relocation assistance advisory measures, facilities
and services). The URA did so by providing moving expenses or fixed moving allowances to
those forced to relocate. See 42 U.S.C. § 4622. A relocation program is also available that
compensates the cost of displacement with comparable replacement dwelling, but a
comprehensive plan for relocation is not required. See Coleman A. Young, Recent Developments
in Urban Development, 21 URB. L. ANN. 317, 368 (1981) (stating that under the URA any
displacing agency must create a relocation assistance advisory program, but such assistance is in
the form of assurances and not duties). However, similar to the objective analysis of just
compensation used by the Supreme Court in takings cases, the URA provides the displaced
person relocation to a dwelling of equivalent fair market rate. See 42 U.S.C. § 4623 (authorizing
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problem of displacement prevails. The most recent proposal to treat the
takings problem is a doctrinal remedy.
2. Exclusionary Eminent Domain Doctrine
Dana proposes a doctrinal remedy known as "exclusionary eminent
domain doctrine" to fix the exclusionary phenomenon. To unpack and
analogize the doctrine, Dana ties together the similar negative effects
that exclusionary zoning and exclusionary eminent domain impose on
low-income communities.
The doctrine is twofold. First, it is a judicial evaluation of a
municipality's action in light of the regional need for low-income
housing.1 02 Second, the doctrine considers the impact the taking has on
a fair share obligation of affordable housing with respect to those needs
and develops a rebuttable presumption of illegality when a municipality
condemns land in an urban setting that decreases the stock of affordable
housing below or further below its fair share obligation.10 3 The
doctrine would not necessarily force the internalization of all real costs
of exclusionary condemnations in the community. 104

The doctrine, like the exclusionary zoning doctrine, would instead
apply heightened review to condemnations of low-income housing in a
locality or neighborhood that has less than its fair share of affordable
housing than a rational basis review would require. 105 The heightened
payments to displacees for the difference between the acquisition cost and the reasonable cost of a
comparable replacement dwelling). The UDA also sought to quell the problem of displacement.
See 12 U.S.C. § 1715(z) (2012) (authorizing periodic assistance to lower income families for
homeownership or membership in cooperative associations); 42 U.S.C. § 1455 (setting forth
requirements to ensure displacees are relocated to decent, safe and sanitary dwellings). The UDA
was enacted in an effort to provide affordable housing for low-income families. The Senate
report emphasized that there ought to be a new strategy for providing housing and giving
American families the widest choice in selecting the type of housing in which they desire to live.
S. REP. NO. 1123-90, at 4 (1968). Originally, the Act sought to achieve a balance in existing
programs, placing emphasis on developing programs that would give lower-income families a
better opportunity of becoming homeowners. Id. That goal was expanded to affordable housing
broadly, not simply homeownership. Id. The UDA sought to improve conditions in the inner city
areas where private investment is scarce, such as low-income communities. Id. at 88. With the
increase of economic redevelopment projects throughout the nation, amendments to the Act can
potentially redirect funds, at a minimum, to where private investment is already taking place to
ensure inclusionary affordable housing because many of the economic redevelopment projects are
already heavily funded by the private developer.
102. See Dana, supra note 5, at 10 (evaluating a locality's actions in terms of the regional
need for low-income housing).
103. Id
104. Id. at 11.
105. Id at 10. Dana distinguishes zoning by invoking three principles that have dominated
judge-made, non-statutory zoning. These principles have been the overriding guide that cause
judges to refrain from imposing limits on exclusionary zoning. Id. at 23-25. Dana's
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review standard would operate like a "reasonably-flexible rebuttable
presumption that exclusionary government actions are illegal," rather
than like a traditional strict scrutiny standard. 106 The municipality
could rebut the presumption by showing an important, local need for the
economic redevelopment project.107 However, the doctrine would not
bar the condemnation of low-income housing in a neighborhood totally,
but would require an application of heightened review to eminent
domain proceedings and condemnations. 1 0 8 Municipalities that seek to
condemn land and exercise eminent domain would have to provide a
more compelling justification for the taking rather than relying on
rational review.109
However, under this proposal, a court would have to engage in this
heightened review in the absence of judicial precedent to guide its
reasoning as to whether a fair share of housing is decreased by the
taking.110 The only closely related precedent would be land use
But the practice of
controls and exclusionary zoning doctrine.
exclusionary zoning occurs, for the most part, in low-density suburban
localities where neighborhood and locality boundaries are easily drawn,
whereas exclusionary eminent domain doctrine would seek to mitigate
the effect of displacement in dense urban areas where neighborhood
boundaries are more difficult to draw.111 This makes determining
whether the condemnee has actually been displaced from his or her
neighborhood difficult for courts. But the adoption of eminent domain
doctrine would presumably result in properties not being acquired

exclusionary eminent domain proposals focus on the third principle which gives local officials the
authority to zone on behalf of the local welfare of only those living within a municipality. Id. at
24. However, courts, particularly in New Jersey, New York and Pennsylvania, have departed
from this third principle and require local officials to consider extra-local welfare where the
zoning law has exclusionary effects on low-income residents and affordable housing. Id. at 2627.
106. Id. at 30-31.
107. Id. at 31.
108. Id The Nollan and Dolan nexus/rough proportionality test for judicial review of land
use exactions is a similar heightened review application. See Nicole Garnett, The Public-Use
Question as a Takings Problem, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 934, 936-37 (2003) (arguing generally
that public use review should be modeled after Nollan/Dolanheightened review).
109. See David A. Dana, Land Use Regulation in an Age of Heightened Scrutiny, 75 N.C. L.
REV. 1243, 1294-97 (1997) (discussing likely responses of regulators and developers to the
prospect of nexus/rough proportionality review in the repeat-game context compared to the onetime context).
I10. Id. In the exclusionary zoning context, courts in New Jersey, New York and
Pennsylvania developed heightened review of exclusionary practices. See Dana, supra note 5, at
26-27.
111. See id.at 29-30 (discussing how exclusionary eminent domain raises the question of how
to define an urban neighborhood in a different way than exclusionary zoning).
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when, and if, the municipality or private developer is unwilling to pay
the full value of the property to the property owners and tenants. 112
Under exclusionary eminent domain doctrine, if a municipality did
not substitute the low-income housing that is condemned for the public
purpose of economic redevelopment, then the taking is unlawful and the
government may not exercise eminent domain.1 3 Municipalities must
provide substitute housing to overcome the loss of low-income housing
under this doctrine. This type of rebuttable presumption allows courts
to decide cases based, in part, on cost-benefit balancing. The courts can
weigh the costs of the exclusionary impact versus the benefits
associated with the exclusionary practice.114
Indeed, Dana is right that there is something problematic with the
exclusionary practice of eminent domain and something must be done
to avoid displacing low-income residents and decreasing access to
affordable housing. Practicing lawyers are also beginning to see the
parallels between exclusionary zoning and exclusionary eminent
domain.11 5 Most important to this Article is that Dana's proposal takes
into account the social cost of losing affordable housing:
[T]he possibility that a doctrine of exclusionary eminent domain will
raise the effective cost of excluding a low-income household beyond
the full social costs of exclusion is mitigated by the fact that the
doctrine allows the locality and developer to avoid the doctrinal limits
by constructing substitute affordable housing. 116
Empowering developers to "avoid the doctrinal limits by constructing
substitute affordable housing"I1 7 deserves further exploration in what is,
otherwise, a convincingly argued doctrinal proposal. Dana eloquently
tells us what is wrong (exclusionary eminent domain) and tells us why
we need a remedy (exclusionary eminent domain doctrine). But how do
we do this? To avoid a judicial limitation by substituting more
affordable housing where it was lost begs the question of how to
112. See id. at 42 (noting that if the municipality or developer values acquisition of the site at
less than the owner subjectively does, the owner will not sell and the site will not be acquired).
113. See id at 45 n.87 (noting that under the federal relocation statute displaced tenants and
homeowners are entitled to a "comparable replacement dwelling").
114. See id. at 31 (positing that a doctrine limiting exclusionary eminent domain may be
efficient, in a cost-internalization sense).
115. Brief of Amicus Curiae Public Advocate of New Jersey at 39, LBK Assocs., LLC v.
Borough of Lodi, No. A-001829-05T2, 2007 WL 2089275 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. July 24,
2007) ("[I]f this principle, [exclusionary zoning,] prohibits municipalities from using zoning to
prevent low- and moderate-income families from locating in their communities, a fortiori it
forbids the use of eminent domain [(exclusionary eminent domain)] to expel low- and moderateincome families already living within their communities.").
116. See Dana, supra note 5, at 52.
117. Id.
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constructively substitute the affordable housing while keeping in mind
the interests of those most affected by the condemnation-low-income
communities.
Exclusionary eminent domain doctrine falls short of showing us how
to constructively substitute or construct affordable housing where
existing housing is to be lost by condemnation. Moreover, Dana missed
an important link that provides a useful analogy to answer the question
of how to construct or preserve affordable housing and to fix the
exclusionary eminent domain problem. 118 One only has to look at
inclusionary zoning-a legislative remedy imposed as a response to
exclusionary zoning doctrine-to begin unpacking the answer to these
ubiquitous land assembly questions. Analogizing the eminent domain
paradigm similarly to the zoning paradigm leads us to a new way of
thinking about how to plan for inclusion in economic redevelopment
projects.
II. CONCEPTUALIZING A NEW EMINENT DOMAIN PARADIGM

Part II discusses the policy behind inclusionary zoning that gives
effect to the court rulings on exclusionary zoning. Further, the tools
used to achieve affordable housing, which include the builder's remedy,
set-aside programs, density bonuses and in-lieu fees, are explicated
from the policy to show how similar tools in the eminent domain
context could be replicated to assist localities construct or preserve lowincome affordable housing within dense urban areas where economic
redevelopment is flourishing throughout the United States.
A. InclusionaryZoning

Inclusionary zoning is broadly defined as any method within the law
that creates more affordable housing in a community. 119 This can
118. Dana seemingly glosses over an important aspect of the Atlantic Yards private
development and goes no further than to note that a community benefits agreement was one way
to include, or substitute, affordable housing developments. See id at 12 (noting that the Atlantic
Yards development "does include a community benefits agreement that provides that some
affordable housing will be constructed in or near the redeveloped area as substitutes for lost
affordable housing"). However, Dana was far too focused on his doctrinal proposal as a remedy
to fix the exclusionary eminent domain phenomenon, saying "the existence of a clearly
recognized exclusionary eminent domain doctrine under New York state constitutional law might
have resulted in a more generous and definite commitment for the creation of new affordable
housing, and would allow for a more effective court enforcement mechanism." Id. at 5. But, as
demonstrated above in the Goldstein matter, 921 N.E.2d 164, 174-75 (N.Y. 2009), an
exclusionary eminent domain doctrinal argument is not persuasive under existing New York state
legislation or under the New York Constitution. Indeed, more than a doctrinal proposal is
needed.
119. See DANIEL R. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW

§

7.26, at 7-23 to -24 (5th ed. 2003)
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include high-density apartments and reduced development standards,
among other strategies discussed shortly.120 In Mt. Laurel II, the court
held that every municipality must provide a realistic opportunity for
decent housing for its poor-in other words, provide its fair share,
expressed in terms of number of units needed immediately and in the
future. 121 Court-mandated inclusionary zoning ordinances1 22 were
designed, implemented and enforced by the New Jersey legislature, and
municipalities were ordered to undertake affirmative measures and
assist development by obtaining state and federal aid. 12 3 New York and
Pennsylvania courts departed from the usual deference to local officials
to zone on behalf of general welfare and instead deployed a loosely
reasoned "fair share" obligation on the municipality to provide
affordable housing.124 The Mt. Laurel saga, however, brought a new
normative perspective on zoning by requiring municipalities to enforce
land use controls on private developers or to induce the developers to

(discussing zoning revisions necessary to encourage affordable housing development).
120. Id.
121. Mt. Laurel I, 456 A.2d 390 (N.J. 1983).
122. See Florence Wagman Roisman, Opening the Suburbs to Racial Integration:Lessons for

the 21st Century, 23 W. NEw ENG. L. REV. 65, 70 (2001) (discussing the New Jersey courts'
restraints on economic segregation). Inclusionary zoning ordinances have been implemented in
Massachusetts where approximately 1000 affordable units through various kinds of "affordability
zoning" have been made mandatory and have increased affordable housing. See Philip B. Herr,
Zoning for Affordability in Massachusetts: An Overview, in Inclusionary Zoning: Lessons
Learned in Massachusetts, NHC AFFORDABLE HOUSING POL'Y REV. (Nat'l Hous. Conference,

Washington, D.C.), Jan. 2002, at 3-4 (discussing various inclusionary zoning provisions in
Massachusetts voluntarily adopted by municipalities). Other communities with inclusionary
ordinances include Boulder and Telluride, Colorado, and Fairfax County, Virginia. See, e.g.,
(2013),
available at
http://www.colocode.
REV.
STAT.
§ 9-13-3
COLO.
com/boulder2/chapter9-13.htm (requiring that 20% of a project's units be affordable for all new
residential developments (regardless of project size) and that inclusionary units remain affordable
in perpetuity).
123. See Mt. Laurel I, 336 A.2d 713, 725-28, 745 (N.J. 1975) ("Land use regulation is
encompassed within the state's police power . . .. [I]t is required that, affirmatively, a zoning
regulation, like any other police power enactment, must promote public health, safety, morals or
the general welfare.... [I]t is beyond dispute that proper provision for adequate housing of all
categories of people is certainly an absolute essential in promotion of the general welfare required
in all local land use regulation ... [and] it has to follow that, broadly speaking, the presumptive
obligation arises for each . .. municipality affirmatively to plan and provide, by its land use
regulations, the reasonable opportunity for ... low and moderate cost housing.").
124. See Dana, supra note 5, at 26-27 (comparing New York and Pennsylvania zoning
decisions to those in New Jersey). Heightened review in the exclusionary zoning context helped
challengers and the courts identify municipalities' unconstitutional zoning practices. Most states
have settled with some form of heightened review of such issues but rarely go as far as to
mandate the municipality implement a fair share of affordable housing. That obligation, for the
most part, is left for the legislature to enact. It took a bold court and a unique set of facts and
history in New Jersey to hand down such a state landmark judgment in Mt. Laurel, which is
arguably an outlier on exclusionary zoning cases in the United States.
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voluntarily increase the stock of affordable housing.1 25 The Mt. Laurel
court, in its rationale for an exclusionary zoning doctrine, may have
foreseen that the decision would push local municipalities and state
legislatures to enact laws mandating inclusionary housing programs.
In 1985, the New Jersey Legislature passed the Fair Housing Act and
created the Council on Affordable Housing ("COAH"), which imposed
regulations to provide affordable housing on municipalities.
Municipalities were tasked with the obligation of using zoning powers
in an affirmative manner to provide a realistic opportunity for the
production of affordable housing for low-income families. Since Mt.
Laurel, there have been two primary routes to achieve this-mandatory
and voluntary tools.
1. The Tools of Inclusionary Zoning
a. Builder's Remedy
The builder's remedy is a voluntary tool used to affect land use and
construct or preserve affordable housing developments. The scheme
grants builders the choice to profit from construction in ways that
exclusionary zoning otherwise would not allow. 126 Here, the private
developer can challenge exclusionary decisions by a local zoning board
on behalf of the public interest. 127 In other words, the developer, who
has been denied permits or variances to build affordable housing, can
appeal the local zoning board's decision. 12 8
This allows the developer to accelerate the process of constructing
affordable housing using an administrative procedure instead of
litigation. The refusal to hold a hearing in response to the appeal
automatically deems the permit granted. However, if the developer
125. However, few state courts have used state constitutional law to overturn exclusionary
zoning laws. Fewer courts have imposed set-aside zoning mandates on the ground that
exclusionary zoning is excessive or discriminatory. Truth be told, Mt. Laurel, to put it mildly,
was a big success ideologically, but its practical effect remains quite limited. Indeed, under
current zoning doctrine, municipalities can overcome presumptions by showing local need. In the
exclusionary eminent domain context, a developer that avoids the doctrinal limitation operates
similarly to the developer operating in the inclusionary zoning builder's remedy context, where
the developer can avoid the zoning law by constructing affordable housing and placing it on the
market at or below the marginal cost of the unit.
126. Andrew Dietderich, An Egalitarian'sMarket: The Economics of Inclusionary Zoning
Reclaimed,24 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 28,47 (1996).

127. Id. In Massachusetts, such a scheme was enacted under the Massachusetts Anti-Snob
legislation, granting private developers the power to exercise the builder's remedy. See generally
Paul K. Stockman, Anti-Snob Zoning in Massachusetts: Assessing One Attempt at Opening the

Suburbs to Affordable Housing, 78 VA. L. REV. 535 (1992) (discussing the Anti-Snob
legislation's incentives to builders).
128. See generally Stockman, supra note 127, at 550 (discussing the appeal process).
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loses on appeal, the developer can obtain a review of the decision before
a state committee. 129 The committee reviews all aspects of the zoning
code, the developer's proposal for affordable housing and the regional
needs for such housing.130 To overcome its burden, the zoning board
must show health, safety, environmental, design, open space or other
local concerns, all of which must clearly outweigh the regional need for
affordable housing. 13 1 Like with exclusionary zoning, there is a strong
presumption against the locality unless it maintains a threshold level of
affordable housing.132
Underlying the builder's remedy is the idea of filtering low-income
housing from the decisions of private developers, not from government
regulation or subsidization. 1 33 The expected result of empowering
developers to exercise the builder's remedy is the development of
affordable housing that would otherwise not be constructed at the
market rate and to then filter down to those who would otherwise lack
access. 134 The problem, however, is that private developers may be
unaware that constructing affordable housing, in and of itself, may not
generate sufficient housing stock in the poorest areas where the income
levels fall well below the market rate. 135 Indeed, unless the locality is
ready to subsidize low-income residents' purchasing power, the
developer may avoid using the builder's remedy or the tool may be used
only to construct middle-income housing.136 The latter process may
benefit the poor only by filtering, which may be helpful for increasing
accessibility to affordable, sometimes inferior, housing, but it is no
substitute for the construction of new affordable housing
developments. 137
Here, the geographic location of the housing under the builder's
remedy is important. For private developers the location of the housing

129. Id. at 551.
130. See Dietderich, supra note 126, at 48 (discussing how the committee determines the
denial of a variance or permit by looking at the regional housing needs).
13 1. Id.
132. Id.
133. See generally Jane E. Larson, Free Markets Deep in the Heart of Texas, 84 GEO. L.J.
179, 235-58 (1995) (rejecting theory that deregulation would produce sufficient, decent
affordable housing and proposing policies that marry market and regulatory strategies to create
such housing in settlements along the Mexico-Texas border).
134. Id.
135. See Dietderich,supra note 126, at 45-46 (discussing the expected change in affordable
housing stock in low income areas based on whether a municipality implements mandatory or
voluntary inclusionary zoning).
136. Id. at 49.
137. Id.
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is of utmost importance in estimating the property's value when and if
sold in the future. 138 If this is the case, then the filter effect may result
in middle-income families capturing the housing rather than the lowest
income brackets. 139 This then begs the question of how affordable
housing is defined under the inclusionary zoning laws and who it is
intended to benefit. If the filter effect fails, the government will have to
intervene to subsidize affordable housing for the poor and the private
developer's use of the builder's remedy goes to those who it was not
intended to benefit. 140 However, if the developer is willing to construct
and place the affordable housing on the market at or below the marginal
cost of a unit, then the developer can avoid the zoning law. 14 1 Further,
if the challenge to the zoning code is successful, the court will grant an
order permitting the developer to construct the affordable housing
development.14 2
However, compared to mandatory ordinances,
voluntary programs like the builder's remedy may be less likely to
produce the same level of affordable units with a much broader and allinclusive range of household incomes through mandatory ordinances. 143

138. Idat5l.
139. See Ellickson, supra note 18, at 1186 (discussing the short-term advantages and longterm disadvantages to moderate- and low- income families from the filtering effect).
140. See Dietderich, supra note 126, at 49 (noting that the developers will either not use the
builder's remedy or the remedy will go to construct middle-income housing).
141. Id.
142. Rose, supra note 2, at 870-74; see also Mt. Laurel II, 456 A.2d 390, 452-53 (N.J. 1983)
(noting that the builder's remedy should be conditioned on the fact that the developer constructs
sufficient low-income housing). In Mt. Laurel I and II, critics were skeptical of the builder's
remedy as a tool to achieve inclusionary zoning because it was a voluntary scheme that required
private developers to act in the public interest. Critics contested that it resulted in little, if any,
construction of affordable housing. However, a builder's remedy may also provide builders an
avenue to provide affordable units and have the costs offset by the bonus of say, for example,
25% or exemptions from other local ordinances. In Mt. Laurel I, the trial court essentially
allowed for the private developer to continue with an affordable housing development plan
regardless of whether the municipality had granted the development permit, if the municipality
failed to uphold its Mt. Laurel I doctrine obligations. See Nolon, supra note 2, at 25-26
(analyzing the three remedies employed in Mount Laurel I). The result of the abovementioned is
that the plaintiff-developer is awarded a rezoning for higher density, multi-family developments.
143. See Nicholas J. Brunick, The Inclusionary Housing Debate: The Effectiveness of
Mandatory Programs Over Voluntary Programs, ZONING PRAC., Sept. 2004, at 2-3 (citing
several studies that found mandatory inclusionary housing programs generate a larger supply of
affordable housing than voluntary programs); see also Dietderich, supra note 126, at 35
(discussing how the Tiebout model disincentivizes affordable housing development by pushing
costs onto developers and new residents). Studies in California have found that fifteen of the
most productive inclusionary housing programs are mandatory. Some studies have found local
ordinances produce a higher rate of affordable housing compared to voluntary inclusionary
housing programs. See Cal. Coal. for Rural Hous. & the Non-Profit Hous. Ass'n of N. Cal.,
InclusionaryHousing in California: 30 Years ofInnovation, NHC AFFORDABLE HOUSING POL'Y

REV. (Nat'l Hous. Conference, Washington, D.C.), Feb. 2004, at 13 (finding mandatory
ordinances provide more affordable housing units for absolute numbers and percentage of total
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Robert Ellickson contends that inclusionary zoning ordinances tacitly
force the supply of affordable housing, resulting in a lack of affordable
housing.144 He argues that ordinances that encourage builder's
remedies may slow the construction of affordable housing and increase
income and race segregation. 145
b. Set-Aside Program
Dietderich contends, however, that voluntary land use control tools,
such as set-aside schemes, "will always increase the stock of affordable
housing-measured either in market value or in number of units
created."1 46 This tool operates like a "conditional builder's remedy"
that takes advantage of the vast demand-assuming the demand is
real-for forbidden suburban uses at market prices to finance the sale
and resale of low-income housing units that fall below the actual cost to
construct the units. 147 Under this tool, the local zoning boards
encourage or require the developer to set-aside a certain percentage of
the units in a for-profit development for affordable housing.148
The set-aside tool is optional and developers can choose to
participate. This scheme may increase the developer's profits and the
value of undeveloped land. 149 However, if the benefits of constructing
below-market units do not outweigh the costs associated with forgoing
more profitable development elsewhere, then developers may be more
likely to return to following localities' exclusionary practices. But
Dietderich contends that the set-aside tool is more profitable for
developers than the builder's remedy because the latter only grants

development than voluntary programs). Moreover, the "voluntary programs do not cause marketrate developers to build or facilitate affordable units unless including affordable housing makes
an application more competitive in the permit approval process." Id. In 1999, a mandatory
inclusionary housing ordinance was adopted in Cambridge, Massachusetts. By 2004, the
program had produced 135 affordable homes with fifty-eight more anticipated for development.
Brunick, supra at 3. In the District of Columbia there were four mandatory county-wide
programs to create affordable housing in mixed-income areas, such as Montgomery County,
Maryland, where the county has constructed over 13,000 affordable housing units over thirty
years. Inclusionary programs have also been implemented in Fairfax County, Virginia, which has
produced affordable homes for extremely low-income households by allowing the local housing
authority to purchase some of the newly created affordable units. New Jersey has also had
success with inclusionary zoning ordinances that encourage the construction of affordable
housing. Nico Calavita, Inclusionary Zoning: The California Experience, NHC AFFORDABLE
HOUSING POL'Y REV. (Nat'l Hous. Conference, Washington, D.C.), Feb. 2004, at 2.
144. Ellickson, supra note 18, at 1215.
145. Id at 1170.
146. Dietderich, supra note 126, at 45.
147. Id. at 49.
148. Id.
149. Id.
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developers relief from local zoning ordinances for proposals to build
affordable-in other words, low-rent-housing.150 The former, on the
contrary, provides the developer options, such as a variance, to
construct any kind of affordable housing development with little, if any,
limitation on profit maximization.151
But Ellickson and other scholars contest the underlying assumptions
of the set-aside tool. The common argument is that developers may lose
out on increased profits by being forced, or tacitly encouraged, to set
aside a certain portion of the housing built for poor families under the
assumption that the developer can still profit.1 52 Municipalities,
Ellickson argues, ought to bear the burden by altering local housing
policies instead of shifting the burden to the private sector. Those in
favor of a land use control tool steered by local agencies may have an
inflated view of what can be expected of local regulators. 153 This
contention is most visible in mandatory inclusionary zoning tools.
c. Density Bonus
The density bonus tool compensates for the set-aside scheme. The
tool mandates that the developer dedicate certain portions of a new
development for affordable housing units that exceed a certain size,
height, floor plan or setback. This bonus is meant to compensate the
developer for anticipated losses. 154 Simply put, the density bonus is
"any increase in the feasible number of units (because of cost savings or
otherwise) over the number of units that the jurisdiction [(locality)]
would otherwise allow." 155 The bypass mechanism of the locality's
zoning code allows for the increase in the number of low-income units
at rates that the poor-who would otherwise be unable to access-can
lease. Similar to the set-aside tool, the density bonus is malleable and is
supposed to expand the supply of below-market housing to assure
dispersal of affordable housing in developing areas within

municipalities. 156
150. Id. at 49-50.
151. Id. at 50.
152. See id. at 26 (stating that inclusionary zoning is a revision of residential zoning rules to
encourage profitable construction of affordable housing).
153. See generally Robert Ellickson, Three Systems of Land Use-Control, 13 HARv. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 67 (1990) (arguing that current zoning practice underestimates the competence of
landowners and overestimates the competence of zoning officials).
154. See Dietderich, supra note 126, at 45 (noting that a mandatory inclusionary program
forces developers to dedicate some of its development to low-income housing but that the density
bonus compensates for the possible losses).
155. Id at 67.
156. Gregory M. Fox & Barbara R. Davis, Density Bonus Zoning to Provide Low and
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The idea is that reducing exclusionary zoning requirements-lot-size,
square footage, set-back distance, number of bedrooms, housing
material, etc.-will result in significant cost savings.1 57 The tool
requires municipalities to grant financial incentives for private
developers to construct a certain percentage of affordable housing units
in a locality that is planned to have five or more units, such as a density
bonus of 25% or more. 158 The developer is granted the bonus if 10% of
the units are set-aside for low- to moderate-income families or 25% for
moderate-income families. 159 Density bonuses are also financial and
political incentives because the tool requires no subsidies from local
government and leaves the developer free work without much
regulation or restriction. 160 The outcome: a reasonable percentage of
the original targeted housing development is made accessible to those
who would otherwise not have the resources to live in the area.
The density bonus tool also helps combat fixed pricing by forcing the
supply of affordable housing to low-income residents who migrated
from the inner city to the suburbs, where it is needed. This is, in part,
due to the economic nature of inclusionary zoning; that is, private
developers desire to construct residential developments in strong
housing markets and exact contributions from the development industry
to produce affordable housing.161 While useful with regard to achieving
a fair share of affordable housing, these mandatory programs may
impose certain requirements that the developers would otherwise not
freely choose themselves. 162 Inclusionary zoning also helps preserve
affordable housing and redevelop depreciating inner-city housing
markets. 163 This approach also concedes that inclusionary zoning
ordinances work to construct affordable housing in strong housing

Moderate Cost Housing, 3 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1015, 1016 (1976).
157. See Dietderich,supra note 126, at 67 (noting that retracting some exclusionary zoning
requirements can reduce costs).
158. Robert A. Johnston et al., Selling Zoning: Do Density Bonus Incentives for ModerateCost Housing Work?, 36 WASH. U. J.URB. & CONTEMP. L. 45, 48 (1989).
159. "Low-income" often means 80% or less of the county or city median income level, while
"moderate-income" often means 80% to 120% of the county or city median income level. Id.
160. See Johnston, supra note 158, at 49. Some density bonus programs, particularly in
Montgomery County, Maryland, allow one bonus unit for every two affordable units. See Fox,
supra note 156, at 1046-48. The result is affordable units that constitute only 5% of the 25,000
residential units built over several years. Id at 1047. The developer, operating under the density
bonus scheme, is compensated for the decreased revenues from the below-market units. Id.
161. Douglas R. Porter, The Promise and Practice of Inclusionary Zoning, in GROWTH
MANAGEMENT AND AFFORDABLE HOUSING: Do THEY CONFLICT? 214, 214 (Anthony Downs

ed., 2004).
162. Id.
163. Id
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markets that can absorb the costs involved with the regulations. But
higher costs always threaten to decrease the amount of development. 16 4
This means that local zoning boards control the resale price for many
years after the properties have been built in order to encourage and
sustain mixed-income housing that is inclusionary for moderate-income
and low-income families. Perhaps most fulfilling-for local officials
and the taxpayers-is that the creation of affordable housing under
inclusionary zoning ordinances, such as density bonuses, cuts costs on
the public treasury. Instead, private developers may bear the burden of
forced subsidized housing for the poor themselves, undercutting their
profit.
Indeed, agency regulated zoning schemes are apt to stumble,
according to some scholars, causing an inefficient misallocation of land,
increased transaction costs as a result of undue administrative costs16 5
and wasteful and arbitrary rent seeking. 166 Ellickson argues that "[t]he
irony of inclusionary zoning is . .. that, in the places where it has

proven most likely to be adopted, its net effects are apt to be the
opposite of the ones advertised," causing a clogged housing market,
higher rent prices, decreased property values and decreased supply of
affordable housing, while failing to assist those who the scheme was
intended to assist. 167
Ellickson, again, contends that municipalities should increase the
production of housing priced beyond the reach of the poor in a filtering
or a trickle-down scheme. 168 Here, the assumption is that a housing

164. In essence, both forms of housing-rental or homes-are sold below the market rate to
accommodate and include those who otherwise would not have access to such property in an
effort to achieve a fair share of affordable housing. Controlling the resale of the rental property
and homes in places where inclusionary ordinances are in place is similar to the local
municipality's authority to regulate and control land use.
165. See generally Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960)
(discussing the problems presented by externalities).

166. See Ellickson, supra note 18, at 1175.
167. See id.at1216.
168. Id. at 1185; see WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMICS OF ZONING LAWS: A PROPERTY
RIGHTS APPROACH TO AMERICAN LAND USE CONTROLS 327-29 (1985) (noting inclusionary
zoning as a tool of wealthy suburban communities who want to halt growth); WILLIAM TUCKER,
ZONING, RENT CONTROL AND AFFORDABLE HOUSING 11-14 (1991) (discussing inclusionary
zoning and noting that it may lead to housing shortages and homelessness); Quintin Johnstone,
Government Control of Urban Land Use: A Comparative Major Program Analysis, 39 N.Y.L.
SCH. L. REv. 373, 392 (1994) (noting that inclusionary zoning may restrict supply of affordable
homes); Jane E. Larson, Free Markets Deep in the Heart of Texas, 84 GEO. L.J. 179, 181 (1995)

(noting that inclusionary zoning regulations inhibit the construction of affordable housing); Carol
M. Rose, Property Rights, Regulatory Regimes and the New Taking Jurisprudence-An
Evolutionary Approach, 57 TENN. L. REV. 577, 588 n.49 (1990) (noting that inclusionary zoning
risks increasing the price of housing).
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unit may filter downward in relative quality as its components
depreciate, and therefore "the filler down process provides higher
quality housing for the poor than can be provided by construction of
new houses for them." 169
Dietderich, on the contrary, takes the position that market forces
operating under inclusionary zoning ordinances create more affordable
housing than if the market forces are left to act alone. 170 Inclusionary
zoning ordinances, Dietderich argues, are likely to "expand the
aggregate supply of housing available across income strata" and leave
regional housing markets no less efficient. 171 Therefore, the choice
between the voluntary and mandatory inclusionary zoning tools, such as
builder's remedies, set-aside schemes or density bonuses, is dependent
on how many affordable housing units a residential area needs. Further,
it depends on whether those who otherwise would not have afforded the
units before the inclusionary scheme was in place, can actually afford to
lease the higher-priced units and allow private developers to internalize
subsidies for lower-priced units. 172
d. In-Lieu Fee
In-lieu fees enable developers to opt-out of the obligation to construct
affordable housing units by paying a fee in-lieu of building more and
allocating the units for low-income renters. The revenue from the fees
is transferred to a government operated fund earmarked to finance
inclusionary housing in the same neighborhood as the development or
developments elsewhere in accordance with regional needs.1 73 In other
cases, the fee revenues are allocated to a local housing authority to be
used to provide affordable housing in the development.174 The
developer can also opt not to pay the fee and avoid on-site inclusionary
units if the developer provides an equivalent number of affordable
housing units off-site. 17 5
In an era of post-Kelo takings, why restrict the use of a land assembly
tool that holds the power to exercise a positive social function for
affected communities with yet another doctrinal proposal that
169. E. MILLS, URBAN ECONOMIC 123 (2d ed. 1980); see also JOHN WEICHER, HOUSING:
FEDERAL POLICIES AND PROGRAMS 25-26 (1980) (finding "less low-quality housing in areas

where there is a high rate of private new housing construction").
170. See Dietderich,supra note 126, at 28-29 (disagreeing with Ellickson).
171. Id. at 28.
172. See id. at 103 (concluding that where "a [great] transfer of neighborhood wealth is
necessary to promote affordable housing, zoning rules should be mandatory").
173. See Ellickson, supra note 18, at 1183.
174. Id.
175.

Id.
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encourages more litigation and court intervention, when there may be an
alternative framework, similar to the tools encouraged in inclusionary
zoning? Eminent domain has nothing in the way of court precedent to
halt the loss of affordable housing and displacement from condemnation
for economic redevelopment purposes. Therefore, a new conceptual
framework is necessary-namely "inclusionary eminent domain."
Inclusionary eminent domain shows us how to fix the exclusionary
eminent domain problem, just as inclusionary zoning sought to fix the
exclusionary zoning phenomenon.
B. InclusionaryEminent Domain

1. The Concept
In the inclusionary zoning context, the developer's incentives include
tax breaks, abatements, fee waivers and the ability to build more units,
which help offset some of the losses the developer may incur from the
inclusionary rules. However, in the inclusionary eminent domain
context-given the difference between regulating land versus
assembling land-the incentive for developers, primarily, is public
support and community cooperation, which sometimes is the key to a
lucrative return on the condemnation of the land anticipated for
development. The Goldstein saga, and the subsequent agreement on
affordable housing in the Atlantic Yards project through a CBA, is one
example of motivating developers to engage in inclusionary eminent
domain. Further, in the zoning context, legislation-enacted in
response to exclusionary zoning doctrine-was the remedy for
excluding others from affordable housing options. In the eminent
domain context, legislation was also enacted in response to the modem
day takings doctrine, which an appalled legislature found to be an
expansion of municipal authority to condemn land.
But, Dana's doctrinal proposal seeks to reinvent the exclusionary
zoning doctrine in the eminent domain context. Although thoughtful,
such proposals do not move us further through the takings muddle. We
need something more. The practice of inclusionary eminent domain, in
the absence of an exclusionary eminent domain doctrine, may "[result]
in a more generous and definite commitment for the creation of new
affordable housing" than Dana's doctrinal remedy.176 The post-Kelo
176. See Dana, supra note 5, at 12; see also DOUGLAS S. MASSEY ET AL., CLIMBING MOUNT
LAUREL: THE STRUGGLE FOR AFFORDABLE HOUSING AND SOCIAL MOBILITY IN AN AMERICAN

SUBURB 184-96 (2013) (showing the positive efficacy of affordable housing developments, such
as the Ethel Lawrence Homes, an inclusionary affordable housing development constructed in
response to Mt. Laurel's exclusionary zoning code). The scholar's empirical findings validate the
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takings doctrine, 177 Dana's new proposal, the current state legislative
frameworkl7 8 and the federal efforts in response to Kelo179 are all
unlikely to fix the exclusionary problem.180 This new normative
concept gives us a model to work from to help fix it.
Inclusionary eminent domain is paradoxical in nature and is akin to
inclusionary zoning. In an effort to minimize the false positive effects
of exclusionary eminent domain, inclusionary eminent domain plans for
inclusion by constructing or preserving affordable housing where it is
anticipated to be lost to condemnation. The difference between
inclusionary zoning and inclusionary eminent domain, therefore, is that
the latter is not a result of heightened judicial review mandating
affirmative legislative obligations on municipalities. Nor is it a direct
legislative proposal in the post-Kelo era, which restricts or bars
municipalities' power to condemn. Instead, inclusionary eminent

use of affordable housing projects as a tool to address exclusionary problems such as housing
scarcity, poverty alleviation and residential segregation. Id.
177. However, the groundwork for a Kelo reversal was laid in the Hathcock ruling, which held
that the government may not use eminent domain to take private property for more profitable
purposes, such as economic redevelopment. Wayne Cnty. v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765, 786-87
(Mich. 2004).
178. NEV. CONST. art. I, § 22, cl. 1 (forbidding transfer of any interest in property taken in
condemnation proceeding from one private party to another private entity); ALASKA STAT. §
09.55.240 (2013) (exempting preexisting public uses declared in state law from a ban on takings
for economic redevelopment); COLO. REV. STAT. § 31-25-103(2) (2013) (defining blight); Id. §
38-1-101 (allowing takings for eradication of blight); FLA. STAT. § 73.014 (2013) (banning blight
condemnations and economic development takings, without mentioning that the state has
substantially used the law for blight condemnations); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 26-501b (2013)
(limiting blight condemnations to instances where property is "unsafe for occupation by humans
under the building codes"); Mo. REV. STAT. § 523.271 (2013) (exempting blight takings from the
ban on economic development takings); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 18-2103, 18-2123, 76-710.04 (2013)
(exempting "blight" condemnations from the ban on economic redevelopment takings); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 160A-503 (2013) (exempting blight condemnations from restrictions on takings for
public purpose of economic redevelopment); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 163.021 (West 2013)
(allowing eminent domain of blighted areas for public uses if certain conditions are met); TEX.
CODE ANN. § 2206.001 (2013) (exempting "blight" condemnations from the ban on economic
development takings); UTAH CODE ANN. § 17C-1-202 (West 2013) (revising the code to omit the
power given in a previous version of the code to use eminent domain for blight alleviation or
redevelopment); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1040 (2013) (prohibiting eminent domain except when
it is for the purpose of "urban renewal"); W. VA. CODE § 16-18-3 (2013) (exempting blight
condemnation from the ban on economic development takings and defining blight to include an
area that "retards the provision of housing accommodations or constitutes an economic or social
liability"). Further, eleven state supreme courts have banned takings for the public purpose of
economic redevelopment under state constitutions-Arkansas, Florida, Illinois, Kentucky, Maine,
Michigan, Montana, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina and Washington.
179. H.R. 1433, 112th Cong. (2012).
180. Ilya Somin, The Limits ofBacklash: Assessing the PoliticalResponse to Kelo, 93 MINN.

L. REV. 2100, 2120-30 (2009) (arguing that laws permitting blight condemnation after Kelo made
banning or restricting condemnation for economic redevelopment nearly irrelevant).
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domain is conceptualized as operating as an organic ex ante and ex post
remedy with little, if any, imposition of the courts or legislation, 181
thereby-similar to Dana's proposal-leaving the Kelo decision and the
government's power of eminent domain for economic redevelopment
purposes intact. 182
This new model encourages a constructive, three-way engagement
process and partnership among the community, private developer and
municipality where condemnation is already, or anticipated, to be
granted by the courts. Inclusionary eminent domain shows us how
private developers and municipalities can reconcile a development
project in accordance with the needs and wants of the affected
community. 1 83 Eminent domain takings should temper and enable the
human elements of economic redevelopment to flourish. The following
sections unpack the concept of inclusionary eminent domain.
2. The Elements
The elements that help fully conceptualize the meaning of
inclusionary eminent domain include: inclusionary housing, meaningful
engagement, community participation, collective action and public
181. This Article does not go so far as to directly make a legislative analogy, such as imposing
mandatory inclusionary eminent domain (like mandatory inclusionary zoning) as part of the land
use approval process or a requirement before condemnation is granted by the courts. That is part
of this evolving new paradigm in takings law that will likely become a reality. Given the barrage
of post-Kelo legislation restricting or barring eminent domain at the state level, and even at the
federal level, one could imagine a city council or state legislature experimenting with a proposal
by amending local ordinances or state enabling laws to encourage or require "inclusionary
eminent domain" provisions enabling agencies, governing bodies and land use approval boards to
oversee the "meaningful engagement" process between the city, private developers and
communities to determine which, if any, of the tools (CBAs, CDCs, LADs, CLTs, LABs and
NIDs) would be utilized throughout the condemnation proceedings or during the redevelopment
project for purposes of constructing or preserving affordable housing. Indeed, some housing
activists and grassroots organizations would find the proposal intriguing, although developers
may find it unappealing.
182. See Ilya Somin, Introduction to Symposium on Post-Kelo Reform, 17 SUP. CT. ECON.

REV. 1,4 (2009) (stating that Dana's exclusionary eminent domain proposal does not seek to curb
takings for economic redevelopment, but to curb "specific abuses arising from the exercise of
eminent domain").
183. Although the concept of inclusionary eminent domain is presented in this Article as a
functional guide for municipalities, private developers and communities, it is conceivable to
expand its practical utility to broader partnerships and coalitions, such as federal and state
governments in cooperation with local businesses, industries, labor organizations, along with
private developers and affected communities. Furthermore, the concept applies to development
projects where middle-class and working class homeowners or renters prefer to move into other
high-end neighborhoods or localities, but the property values stagnate or freeze at levels
unattainable to those groups. Indeed, many localities can benefit from middle-income and
working-class populations migrating (or simply remaining situated) in the locality for, among
other things, long-term growth, sustainability and development.

884

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 45

approval. Each element is an important part of the practical and
conceptual operation of the tools of inclusionary eminent domain. A
broader and perhaps more common theme that these elements embody,
and that inclusionary eminent domain seeks to espouse, is the valuing of
self-governance of common-pool resources (such as affordable housing)
and the enabling of low-income communities to work effectively in
cooperation with private developers and municipalities to manage the
construction or preservation of housing while at the same time
overcoming collective action problems.1 84
Inclusionary housing: Affordable housing is the crux of the
exclusionary eminent domain phenomenon. Inclusionary housing seeks
to ensure that a fair share percentage of affordable units are set aside
and constructed within economic redevelopment projects where existing
housing is planned to be condemned and razed for purposes of a larger
project. In the zoning context, inclusionary housing programs were
imposed by state legislatures that required a fair share percentage of
units to be developed in a building that was within a specific zoning
area in order to meet the regional needs of affordable housing. This
ensures that affordable housing is dispersed within the economic
redevelopment project and areas outlying the project area where those
who must be displaced may move. By constructing inclusionary
housing in an economic redevelopment project, the effects of
exclusionary eminent domain are mitigated and offset.
Meaningful engagement: Elsewhere in the world, courts have looked
to an evolving process known as meaningful engagement to resolve
property and land use disputes where affordable housing and shelter is
threatened.18 5 This process has not been widely published on or
discussed in the American legal lexicon. 1 86 The practice of inclusionary
eminent domain must be linked to the idea of meaningful engagement
where municipalities and private developers can reconcile their interests
in order to encourage a process that prevents the exclusion of poor and
low-income communities. 187
184. See Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently

Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 742-49 (1986) (describing the historic development of
managed commons).
185. See generally Stuart Wilson, Planning for Inclusion in South Africa: The State's Duty to
Prevent Homelessness and the Potential of "Meaningful Engagement", 22 URB. F. 265 (2011)

(discussing South African law, which forbids evictions which lead to homelessness).
186. Id. at 267.
187. See id. at 272-74 (discussing the duty of municipalities in South Africa to engage with
the property owners they seek to evict). This idea of "meaningful engagement" derives from the
South Africa urban regeneration context, where courts are continuously holding municipalities
affirmatively responsible to uphold constitutional obligations to provide shelter for unlawful

2014]

InclusionaryEminent Domain

885

Land use planning by municipalities and private developers in
America has not been primarily focused on the social costs of utilizing
land assembly tools, such as eminent domain, to achieve economic
redevelopment or urban renewal. Urban planning has, for the most part,
followed a procedural process of adopting and complying with land use
and land assembly regulations, building regulations and nuisance issues.
Few state legislatures or courts-the outlier being New Jersey-have
deigned to consider imposing affirmative duties on the municipality to
take into consideration the social and human consequences of land use
and land assembly. Like Dana's proposal,188 inclusionary eminent
domain would encourage municipalities and private developers to
internalize some of the social costs involved in the taking of land
without the imposition of affirmative obligations from the courts or the
legislature.
Meaningful engagement in the American property and land use
context would entail municipalities and private developers-in
undertaking economic redevelopment-considering the potential
consequences of the takings for the affected community and the
measures that could be implemented before, during or after proceedings
to alleviate those consequences. Courts do not have the authority to
deny a taking for economic redevelopment on the grounds of a loss of
affordable housing, but they can ask the municipality and the private
developer to engage with the community through various tools. 189 The
municipality and private developer ought to show that they made
reasonable efforts190 to engage with the affected community on the
proposed economic redevelopment project at various points throughout
the economic redevelopment process.191 This may require courts in the
occupiers evicted from private or public property where the eviction leads to homelessness and to
engage in a process of meaningful engagement to lead the relocation process. See Dickinson,
Blue Moonlight Rising, supra note 38, at 470-73 (discussing the South African Constitutional
foundations for meaningful engagement); see also Dickinson, The Blue Moonlight Remedy, supra

note 38, at 566-72 (highlighting the housing problems caused by large-scale urban regeneration in
Johannesburg and the impact that dramatic transformations in property rights, such as protections
from eviction for those evicted from private property, may have on developers, municipalities and
affected communities).
188. See supra Part I.B.2 (discussing Dana's proposal).
189. See infra Part III (discussing the tools of inclusionary eminent domain).
190. There are a variety of terms that have been used to establish a standard, including
"reasonable efforts," "reasonable best efforts," "commercially reasonable efforts," "diligent
effort," "every effort" and "good faith efforts." The standard used should be determined through
the meaningful engagement process. Indeed, certain terms will impose different levels of
obligations that will either benefit the community or benefit the developer. The meaningful
engagement process amongst the parties, not the courts or the legislature, should decide that
standard at the initial stages.
191. This element of inclusionary eminent domain derives from the legal context in South

886

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 45

eminent domain context, like the zoning context in Mt. Laurel, to order
that parties report back with detailed information prior to, during or
after eminent domain proceedings about reasonable efforts to alleviate
the problem of exclusionary eminent domain. Meaningful engagement
would evolve from another element of inclusionary eminent domaincommunity participation.
Community participation: The element of community participation
focuses more narrowly on aspects of meaningful engagement. It is
commonly understood that limited-access and common-resource pools,
such as affordable housing, flourish with strong mechanisms of selfgovernment that enable communities affected or threatened by
condemnation to overcome collective action problems. 192 Here,
community participation is a layered approach for determining who
represents the community in land assembly matters and how the
community goes about organizing itself to prepare for negotiations with
a private developer and municipality. As William Fischel contends,
having "voice" is the general ability to participate in and influence
political processes-one that has certain protections from excessive
regulation.1 93 Community participation and its subsequent voice is
important because underlying much of the needs and wants of the
community in eminent domain proceedings is who is speaking on behalf
of the concerns and how the concerns are being conveyed, not only to
the private developer and the municipality, but to the broader public as
well.
Community participation entails the affected community following a
decision-making process that considers the viewpoints of all members
and not a select few. What is missing from Dana's proposal is a
discussion of the affected community's interaction with the private
developer and municipality to address the affordable housing problem.
His proposal merely places the burden on the private developer to

Africa discussed supra note 187. However, the element of meaningful engagement in the
inclusionary eminent domain context does not push for such affirmative duties because the
American property law structure does not lend to imposing positive obligations on the state. In
some states, such as New York, courts have ignored the United States Supreme Court dogma that
does not recognize a right to housing or other affirmative obligations and instead have allowed for
loose language placing some affirmative obligations on the state to provide accommodation. See
N.Y. CONST. art. XVIII, § 1 ("[T]he legislature may provide in such manner, by such means and
upon such terms and conditions as it may prescribe for low rent housing ... accommodations for
persons of low income as defined by law .... .").
192. See Rose, supra note 184, at 749 (invoking the concept of self-management by orderly
and civilized people).
193. William A. Fischel, Lead Us Not into Penn Station: Takings, Historic Preservation, and
Rent Control, 6 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REv. 749, 751 (1995).
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construct substitute housing without any concrete suggestions as to how
to construct the housing in accordance with the needs and wants of the
community. In contrast, community participation encourages civil
society organizations to help organize communities in developing a list
of desired resources, particularly affordable housing, and a plan of
action when facing condemnation and displacement. 194
Collective action: As Garret Hardin wrote in The Tragedy of the

Commons, community participation helps to solve some of the
collective action problems that arise in, for example, land assembly
conflicts. 195 Collective action in the eminent domain context arises
where the possibility of losing affordable housing looms. In other
words, the disintegration of ownership or the prospect of losing
ownership gives rise to multiple collective action problems, such as
However, the community
holdouts, free-riders and evasion. 196
participation element assists in devising a structure to ensure members
of the community have some power to accept or decline a proposed
economic redevelopment project where eminent domain is exercised.
From an ex ante perspective, structured participatory mechanisms, such
as voting policies and community leadership positions, allow
stakeholders to eliminate the abuse of eminent domain and surmount the
community's collective opposition against the project. The elements of
collective action and community participation play significant roles in
how CBAs, CDCs, LADs and NIDs operate.
Public approval: Perhaps one of the most important elements of
inclusionary eminent domain-particularly in the aftermath of Kelo-is
public approval of proposed condemnation for purposes of economic
redevelopment.1 97 The public is less than enthused by the idea that the
state has the power to take private property and transfer the property to
another private entity in the name of "public use." When Pfizer folded
its plan to relocate to New London after the Kelo decision, the public's
distaste for the use of eminent domain for public use soured even
further. The words "condemnation" and "eminent domain" arguably
have negative connotations for both public officials and voters.
194. Lawyers, as part of civil society organizations, can play a role in this as well. See
generally Sheila R. Foster & Brian Glick, Integrative Lawyering: Navigating the Political

Economy of Urban Redevelopment, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1999 (2007) (discussing the West Harlem
Environmental Action campaign in West Harlem, New York and the decentralization of power in
urban redevelopment and lawyers' role in the process).
195. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 Sci. 1243 (1968).
196. See Michael Heller & Rick Hills, Land Assembly Districts, 121 HARv. L. REv. 1465,
1472-82 (2008) (discussing the problems of land assembly districts and eminent domain).
197.

Patrick McGeehan, Pfizer To Leave City That Won Land-Use Case, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.

13, 2009, at Al.
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The practice of inclusionary eminent domain seeks to rethink the
negative connotations and instead invoke an inviting terminology of
"inclusion" that public officials, residents and developers can utilize in
the planning process. Elected officials obtain a better understanding of
their constituencies' desires by adhering to the public interest where
eminent domain is proposed for development purposes.
These abovementioned elements are found intertwined and
interwoven within the social, economic and political fabric of the tools
of inclusionary eminent domain. The tools are the most important part
of the successful practice and operation of this new land assembly
model.
III. THE TOOLS OF INCLUSIONARY EMINENT DOMAIN
This Part offers a variety of land assembly tools that have been used
in urban redevelopment projects and urban planning schemes
throughout the United States. The tools have historically been used for
a variety of purposes, such as infrastructure, residential and commercial
development and other land assemblage. However, here the discussion
and analysis of the tools are adjusted in accordance with the
inclusionary eminent domain framework; that which is modeled for
purposes of constructing or preserving affordable housing developments
on land condemned for economic redevelopment. Legislation in most
states enables to some degree-but does not require or mandatecommunities, municipalities and private developers to utilize the
following tools for economic redevelopment purposes. While each tool,
in and of itself, is capable of achieving the construction or preservation
of affordable housing within economic redevelopment projects, the
tools are also interrelated and overlap in operation.
A. Community Benefits Agreement

CBAs are private, legally binding contracts between private
developers, municipalities and various community representatives
setting forth a range of benefits to be included in a development project,
which are the result of substantial community involvement. 198 CBAs
should promote the core values of inclusiveness and accountability.1 99
They also help obtain the cooperation and participation of community
organizations that might otherwise object to and stall the development
project. Community opposition, therefore, also has a causal effect on
198. Julian Gross, Community Benefit Agreements: Definitions, Values,
Enforceability, 17 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 36, 37 (2007).
199. Id. at 37-39.
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whether an economic redevelopment project receives regulatory
approval through the land use approval process or public subsidies. 200
Further, opposition to a CBA poses a threat to the entire development
project and securing other forms of funding. 201 For developers, a
promise of support is important because it helps the developer negotiate
state subsidies and maintain good public relations. 202
For purposes of this Article, a CBA also concerns a single economic
redevelopment project where eminent domain proceedings have
commenced and the land has been condemned to begin construction. 203
Inclusiveness entails having a broad range of community concerns
heard and addressed prior to a development project's approval. 204 To
achieve inclusiveness, the CBA must have a broad coalition of
organizations with demands that bring some weight to the negotiation
table with municipalities and private developers. 205 This aspect of
meaningful engagement involves a community coalition with the
strength to persuade a private developer to negotiate in the interests of
the community. 206 The prospect of a CBA also helps leverage demands
at the negotiating table. Private developers or municipalities may also
propose a CBA. 20 7
Community coalitions hold the power to publicly support or oppose
an economic redevelopment project. 2 08 If support is given only upon
conditions that are beneficial to the community, such as the developer
agreeing to set aside a fair share of affordable housing in the economic
redevelopment project, then a legally enforceable mechanism such as a

200. Vicki Been, Community Benefits Agreements: A New Local Government Tool or Another
Variationon the Exactions Theme?, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 5, 7 (2010).

201. Id.
202. JULIAN GROSS, GREG LEROY & MADELINE JANIS-APARICIO, COMMUNITY BENEFIT
AGREEMENTS: MAKING DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS ACCOUNTABLE 9-10 (2002).

203. Julian Gross's CBA definition excludes policies and documents setting forth required
conditions for a range of projects, such as redevelopment plans, general plans, specific plans,
zoning laws and other land use documents. Moreover, Gross excludes benefits, such as
"inclusionary housing policies" and ordinances or resolutions, that make procedural
improvements in the approval processes. Therefore, while Gross contends that zoning laws,
ordinances and "inclusionary housing policies" should not be part of the CBA definition, I
contend-for conceptualization purposes-that they ought to be a part of the CBA process. See
Gross, supra note 198, at 39 (noting that a CBA concerns a single development project, thereby
excluding policies and documents outlining the requirements for groups of projects).
204. Id at 37-38.
205. Id. at 38.
206. Id
207. Been, supra note 200, at 7-8.
208. See id. at 15-18 (explaining the ways in which a communities may assist the
development process).
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CBA may be the way to attain that support. 209
The CBA, under the inclusionary eminent domain framework,
operates in a similar manner to the builder's remedy by allowing the
developer and the community to accelerate the process of constructing
affordable housing using administrative procedures and legally binding
negotiations instead of litigation. Accountability, therefore, is also
important in the CBA process.
Indeed, promises made by the
redevelopment agency, the municipality and the private developer with
regard to the community benefits should be a legally binding process
and enforced against the parties. 210 The CBA has been utilized to
construct or preserve affordable housing in economic redevelopment
projects successfully on the West Coast and has increasingly, albeit with
less success, become an important tool for land assembly and affordable
housing on the East Coast. 2 11

209. See Gross, supra note 198, at 38-39 (explaining that CBAs advance accountability).
210. Id.
211. CBAs first appeared on the West Coast, with California having the first in 1998. The
agreement was struck with the development of the Hollywood and Highland Center. The
development project included 4000 theater seats, several parking lots and hotels, 1.2 million
square feet of retail space and was projected to cost $388 million. The benefits package for the
development project also included living wages and job training provisions along with affordable
housing. Shortly after the success of the Hollywood project came another CBA success with the
construction of the Staples Center in Los Angeles. See Patricia E. Salkin & Amy Lavine,
Negotiatingfor Social Justice and the Promise of Community Benefits Agreements: Case Studies
of Current and Developing Agreements, 17 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L.

113, 116 (2008). At the start of the Staples Center development project, the community residents
were led astray after the developer failed to provide the promised benefits when the first phase of
the project had been completed. The negotiations involved the developer and the Figueroa
Corridor Coalition for Economic Justice ("FCCEJ"). The FCCEJ represented more than thirty
community organizations. Part of the planned project was to provide permanent affordable
housing. See STAPLES CENTER COMMUNITY BENEFITS AGREEMENT A-9 to -10 (June 20, 2011),

available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/58303580/Staples-Center-Community-Benefits-Agree
ment-CBA. To ensure some oversight and enforcement, the CBA established a committee to
monitor the agreement and to maintain dialogue between the developer and the coalition. In fact,
shortly thereafter the developer issued the funds for the construction of affordable housing. See
Salkin & Lavine, supra,at 117. In San Diego, a strong coalition of twenty-seven housing, labor
and environmental groups coalesced to create a CBA with the developer JMI/Lennar in the
development of Ballpark Village. Significantly, the CBA forced changes to the original project's
affordable housing plans, which had initially not included housing on site. The CBA forced the
developer to make the housing inclusionary. See generally Ballpark Village Project CBA,
CENTER ON POL'Y INITIATIVES, http://onlinecpi.org/campaigns/ballpark-village-cbal (last visited

Dec. 28, 2013) (noting that the community coalition pressured the developer to include more than
the usual amount of affordable housing). In Oakland, the Oak of 9th project had a CBA attached
to it in 2006. The project planned to construct 3000 residential units and a retail complex. E.
BAY ALLIANCE FOR A SUSTAINABLE ECON., BUILDING A BETTER BAY AREA: COMMUNITY
BENEFIT TOOLS AND CASE STUDIES TO ACHIEVE RESPONSIBLE DEVELOPMENT 39-41 (2008);

see

also

COOPERATION

AGREEMENT

(OAK

TO

NINTH

PROJECT),

available at

http://urbanstrategies.org/programs/econopp/documents/FinalOaktoNinthCooperationAgreeement
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The Atlantic Yards redevelopment project in Brooklyn, New York is
separate and distinct from other CBAs and development projects across
the United States. Recall Goldstein where the municipality exercised
eminent domain to take property for the public purpose of economic
redevelopment and struck a CBA with the community to ensure that the
project plan had inclusionary housing. 212 The Atlantic Yards CBA
modeled the Staples Center CBA, which progressively negotiated a
CBA that emphasized enforceability, accountability, transparency and

withCoalitionfinalexecution.pdf (providing the terms of the 2006 CBA); OAK TO 9TH CMTY.
BENEFITS COAL., MAKING A NEIGHBORHOOD FOR ALL OF OAKLAND: A COMMUNITY PROPOSAL
FOR AFFORDABLE HOUSING AND JOBS IN THE OAK TO 9th DEVELOPMENT SITE 4 (2005),
http://urbanstrategies.org/programs/econopp/documents/Oakto9thCommunity
at
available
BenefitsCoalitionReport-July2005.pdf (introducing the Oak to 9th Development Project); Salkin
& Lavine, supra, at 120 (providing a summary of the Oak to 9th CBA). The agreement was
entered into by a coalition of community members and the redevelopment agency and primarily
focused on affordable housing. Significantly, it authorized injunctive relief to be awarded to the
community for noncompliance. CBAs have also succeeded in the Midwest. In 2005,
Milwaukee's Park East Redevelopment had a CBA attached to it. One aspect of the CBA
required the county to provide affordable housing. See Salkin & Lavine, supra, at 126. In New
York, CBAs have faced considerable opposition and arguably less success than those on the West
Coast. In Kaur v. New York State Urban Development Corp. a victory for Columbia University
seemed all but certain until the appellate court overturned the lower court's ruling that had
previously banned the state from exercising the power of eminent domain to take private property
for the non-profit institution's seventeen-acre expansion project in West Harlem and
Manhattanville without the property owner's consent. In re Kaur v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp.,
933 N.E.2d 721 (N.Y. 2010), rev'g 892 N.Y.S.2d 8 (App. Div. 2009). The court held that the
judiciary must defer to the state to determine whether a location is "blighted" and that
condemnation on behalf of a university served a public purpose. Id. at 733-35. The provision of
affordable housing was proposed by the University in a Memorandum of Understanding. The
University proposed a $20 million fund to develop or preserve affordable housing. COLUMBIA
UNIV., UNIV. SENATE, MANHATTANVILLE AND ACADEMIC AND PHYSICAL PLANNING AT
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY (2010). The affordable housing was recognized in the Final
Environmental Impact Statement ("FEIS") to minimize the "significant adverse indirect
residential displacement impacts" due to a projected "upward pressure on market-rate rents." See
N.Y.C. DEP'T OF CITY PLANNING, MANHATTANVILLE: FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
STATEMENT 4-4, 25-1 (2007), available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/htmVenvreview/
manhattanville.shtml (follow the hyperlinks for the relevant chapters). The applicants argued that
the provision of affordable housing, among other provisions, cannot be considered "civic
purposes" or "public purposes of the project." Columbia agreed to provide an affordable housing
and legal services fund, subsidize the West Harlem Piers Park, fund the I.S. 195 playground,
extend Columbia's small business retail strategy, commit between 4 and 18% of retail space in
the project site to local entrepreneurs, enact construction safety mitigation procedures, provide
construction jobs for minorities, provide meeting space and offices for Community Board 9 and
provide unspecified community access to Columbia's proposed facilities. The City 269 Planning
Commission's recommendation also refers to Columbia's commitment to develop a mind, brain
and behavior public outreach center. See Brief for Petitioner at 52-53, In re Tuck-It-Away v.
N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 892 N.Y.S.2d 8 (App. Div. 2009) (No. 778), 2009 WL 7446916
(arguing that the Columbia project is not a civic project).
212. Goldstein, 13 N.Y.3d 511 (2009); see supra notes 82-101.
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inclusiveness. 213
After the Goldstein decision, the State of New York had its first CBA
in its history. The agreement was the legally-binding force behind
ensuring that low-income families and community members had a direct
voice in the decision-making process and planning of affordable
housing 214 in the Atlantic Yards project. 2 15 Prior CBAs around the
United States were part of a larger development, but in those examples
the municipality did not exercise eminent domain. In contrast, the
Atlantic Yards CBA was drafted in response to condemnation
proceedings, thus making it a strong conceptual and practical example
of inclusionary eminent domain.
Forest City Ratner, the developer, promised to construct affordable
housing within the Atlantic Yards redevelopment project to replace the
housing stock projected to be lost from condemnation. 2 16 The CBA
was drafted with the support of eight community organizations and the
developer. The agreement was considered an "historic commitment to
affordable housing." 2 17 The CBA also had the support from over 200
community leaders. The actual percentage has varied over the years. A
fair share percentage was proposed at 50% at the beginning stages of
the project, but then decreased to 30% affordable housing. The CBA
relied upon "governmental contributions for site development and
affordable housing subsidies." 218 The initial goal was for the
ACORN/Atlantic Yards 50/50 Program to use the existing Housing
Development Corporation's bond program and the Department of

213. See Salkin & Lavine, supra note 211, at 121-22 (analyzing the Atlantic Yards case
study).

See generally Community Benefits Agreements, COMMUNITY BENEFITS L. CENTER,

http://www.forworkingfamilies.org/cblc/cba (last visited Dec. 28, 2013).
214. The CBA also included educational initiatives, jobs for minorities and women, as well as
pre- and post-construction job training. It contained environmental assurances and a commitment
to develop community facilities, such as child-care and youth and senior centers, and it ensured
community access to the arena for local events such as high school and college graduations and
for religious congregations. COMMUNITY BENEFITS AGREEMENT 11-13,26-35 (2005), available

at http://www.buildbrooklyn.org/pr/cba.pdf.
215. Id. at 22.

216. See Press Release, Mayor Michael R. Bloomberg, Forest City Ratner CEO and President
Bruce Ratner and Civic Leaders Sign Community Benefits Agreement (June 27, 2005), available
at http://www.nyc.gov/html/hpd/html/pr2005/mayors-release248-05-pr.shtml.
217. Michael Freedman-Schnapp, A New Dynamic: Atlantic Yards Challenges Brooklyn

ProgressivePolitics, NEXT AM. CITY, Jan. 1, 2006, at I1. The signatories of the agreement
included Faith in Action, the Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now
("ACORN"), Brooklyn United for Innovative Local Development ("BUILD"), Brooklyn Voices
for Children, the Downtown Brooklyn Neighborhood Alliance ("DBNA"), the Brooklyn
Endeavor Experience ("BEE"), the New York State Association of Minority Contractors
("NYSAMC") and the Public Housing Communities ("PHC"). Id.
218. See COMMUNITY BENEFITS AGREEMENT, supra note 214, at 23, exhibit D, annex A.
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Housing Preservation and Development programs to construct the
housing. 219 However, a battle has endured over the "promise" of
affordable housing. 220
While fair share affordable housing-which the petitioners in
Goldstein argued the state constitution required-failed on its merits,
the private developer and the community agreed to construct a certain
percentage of affordable units to replace lost affordable housing without
the constraints of heightened judicial review which, under an
exclusionary eminent domain doctrine, would have forced developers to
substitute the lost affordable housing with new affordable housing.
Instead, the CBA-without the imposition of courts or the legislaturewas the controlling factor that led to the agreement to construct
affordable housing.
However, accountability has been a problem. One of the primary
justifications for the taking of blighted property in Atlantic Yardsaffordable housing-has been scrutinized even though "it was
reasonable to expect the benefits from the Community Benefits
Agreement when it was signed." 22 1 The slow economy may have
become an impediment, but it has been reported that FCR had indicated
that plans for affordable housing appear to have been indefinitely
delayed. 222 It was well documented in the CBA that there was not a
minimum threshold for affordable housing. 223
The definition of "affordable" in the CBA has been a highly

219. See Been, supra note 200, at 26 n.97 (noting that the Atlantic Yards CBA promises to
provide affordable housing but foresees that the housing will use various public subsidy
programs); see also COMMUNITY BENEFITS AGREEMENT, supra note 214, at 23, exhibit D, annex

A (stating that "the program may also utilize existing Housing Finance Agency (HFA),
Affordable Housing Corporation (AHC) or Housing and Urban Development (HUD) programs,
with necessary modifications").
220. See generally Bloomberg, supra note 216 (noting the challenges overcome in order to
implement the CBA).
221.

Norman Oder, A (Somewhat Speculative) FAQ on the Atlantic Yards News, ATLANTIC

YARDS REP. (Mar. 22, 2008), http://atlanticyardsreport.blogspot.com/2008/03/speculative-faq-onatlantic-yards-news.html.

See generally MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING 1-6 (2005).

A

fifty-fifty affordable housing deal was made in a Memorandum of Understanding ("MOU")
between FCR and the ACORN and was then attached to the CBA, presumably providing some
enforceability of affordable housing. See Norman Oder, CBA "Watchdog" Sought to Ensure
"History Making" Benefits 'for Local Community," ATLANTIC YARDS REP. (Mar. 19, 2007),
http://atlanticyardsreport.blogspot.com/2007/03/cba-watchdog-sought-to-ensure-history.html
(scrutinizing the Atlantic Yards CBA).
222. Charles V. Bagli, Slow Economy Likely to Stall Atlantic Yards, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21,

2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/21/nyregion/21yards.html.
223. See COMMUNITY BENEFITS AGREEMENT, supra note 214, at 22-26 (providing the
requirements for housing); see also MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING, supra note 221, at 4

(providing that 50% of the housing units on the project site constitute affordable housing).
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contested aspect of the project. The Atlantic Yards project used area
median income ("AMI") for the New York City metropolitan area to
determine market-rate rental prices, rather than AMI in Brooklyn. 224
This calculation can conflate the definition of "affordable" housing with
the threshold for what qualifies as "low income" in Brooklyn,
particularly those whose annual incomes fall below the AMI.225
Therefore, the housing stock produced may become above-market rate
housing for the area, which would be far beyond the annual household
income for many residents in Brooklyn.
According to the EIS study, the "socioeconomic characteristics of the
new population (e.g., in household income and household size) would
not be markedly different from the characteristics of the population
living in the broader %-mile study area." 226 With figures like these
using AMI calculations, it is possible that the existing Brooklyn lowincome population may be priced out of newly developed units because
the scale for affordability is higher than annual household incomes. 227
Some argue that even if 35% of the housing development is affordable,
the overall increase in affordable housing would likely be less than a
fair proportion of substitute housing. 228
Municipalities may need to require that the terms of the CBA be
made part of the redevelopment project between the quasi-state entity
and developer. 229 However, CBAs are not authorized in all states and
some states do not authorize municipalities to enter into the negotiations
or agreements. 230 In such cases the CBAs are only enforceable by the
contracting community groups. 23 1
This issue of state-by-state
224. EMPIRE STATE DEV., ATLANTIC YARDS FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT
S-5 (2006) [hereinafter FEIS], available at http://www.esd.ny.gov/SubsidiariesProjects/AYP/
AtlanticYards/AdditionalResources/AYFEIS/00_ExecutiveSummary.pdf; id. at 4-50, available
at http://www.esd.ny.gov/Subsidiaries Projects/AYP/AtlanticYards/AdditionalResources/AYF
EIS/04_Socio.pdf.
225. Amy Lavine & Norman Oder, Urban Redevelopment Policy, Judicial Deference to
Unaccountable Agencies, and Reality in Brooklyn's Atlantic Yards Project, 42 URB. LAW. 287,
320 (2010) (discussing the differences in AMI between Brooklyn and the metropolitan area).
226. FEIS, supra note 224, at 4-57. The study further said that the "shifts in the distribution
of households across income brackets would be small and would not substantially affect the
overall socioeconomic character of the study area." Id.
227. See Lavine & Oder, supra note 225, at 320.
228. See id. at 318-20 (explaining that the actual amount of affordable housing offered was
about 35% of the project and that the use of a citywide AMI would actually result in the
"affordable" housing being priced beyond what most current residents could afford).
229. Been, supra note 200, at 34.
230. See generally Michael H. Crew, Development Agreements after Nollan v. California
Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987), 22 URB. LAW. 23, 27-31 (1990) (explaining
development agreements and challenges that developers face in some states).
231. See Gross, supra note 198, at 49-51 (discussing ways that public CBAs can be made
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authorization creates murky waters for states like New York that have
many large, ongoing economic redevelopment projects but do not have
any statutory oversight to ensure the CBAs are successfully executedthe only legally binding aspect of the CBA is the primary enforcement
mechanism. However, CBAs are only successful when they are
enforceable. 232
It is important to note that municipalities in New York do not have
authorization to enter into redevelopment agreements as part of a land
development approval process. 233 Some of the underlying issues that
the Atlantic Yards CBA has experienced may in fact be linked to the
fact that there is no statutory or legislative authority overseeing the
CBA at the federal, state or local level. Therefore, while the goal is for
the CBA, along with the other tools, to operate as an organic remedy to
construct or preserve inclusionary housing, there is also the case to be
made that tools such as the CBA may need legislative or judicial
oversight. 234 Nonetheless, the CBA is a warranted addition to the
inclusionary eminent domain toolbox.
B. LandAssembly District

LADs are another innovative local tool that fall under the framework
of inclusionary eminent domain. The purpose and function of LADs "is
to unify property interests without expropriating property owners." 2 3 5
In the midst of the eminent domain muddle and the courts' slow
response to untangling the complexities of takings for the public
purpose of economic redevelopment, LADs have been proposed as an
inclusive and community-driven tool to assemble land.236 The model
enforceable through the use of community groups).
232. See Salkin & Lavine, supra note 211, at 115 ("This reality[-that many CBAs are
enforceable only by the contracting community groups-]raises a number of as yet untested legal
issues, including who will have standing to challenge and enforce privately negotiated CBAs, and
whether these voluntary agreements, regardless of their terms, will be enforceable in a court of
law."). See generally Patricia E. Salkin & Amy Lavine, Understanding Community Benefits
Agreements: Equitable Development, Social Justice and Other Considerationsfor Developers,
Municipalities and Community Organizations, 26 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 291, 324-28

(2008) (addressing some of the legal issues related to enforcing CBAs).
233. Salkin & Lavine, supra note 211, at 120-21.
234. Lavine & Oder, supra note 225, at 289-90 ("The planning process, or lack thereof, raises
serious concerns about the transparency .... It is likely that a good deal of the conflict could
have been reduced had FCR and ESDC pursued a more open and inclusive process from the
outset, and had they been willing to fairly consider and incorporate public input in the
development of the project's plans.").
235. See Heller & Hills, supra note 196, at 1468.
236. See id at 1469-70 (rejecting the tragedy of the anticommons solution, that is, a call for
the Leviathan where disinterested experts are employed by a larger-scale government who figure
out what the parties would have done were they capable of contracting or self-government).
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arises out of frustration with the two traditional methods of assembling
land in the United States-voluntary assembly and eminent domain.
Voluntary assembly leads to a holdout problem, resulting in
underassembly, while eminent domain leads to a "fair market value"
problem resulting in capricious redistribution with little regard for the
subjective or emotional valuation of the property. 237 Thus, LADs main
purpose is "to overcome the landowners' collective action problems that
prevent them from selling their land for an efficient assembly." 238
Heller and Hills propose giving back what they see as the
communities' share in the benefits of condemnation, not the burdens
associated with the taking. 239 LADs seek to solve some of the
distributive injustice on low-income communities and property owners
in general. 240 As discussed earlier in this Article, assembling public
land, particularly when it involves condemning and razing property for
economic redevelopment, encounters hostility by low-income and even
middle-class residents and homeowners.
Thus, LADs give neighbors the freedom to decide, collectively, what
for and how their land will be assembled when a municipality proposes
the exercise of eminent domain. This land assembly design, retrofitted
for purposes of eminent domain, would give neighbors veto power to
reject economic redevelopment projects that are not worth the time and
costs. 241 The LAD proposal also seeks to redesign property rights in a
way that enhances both welfare and fairness in the wake of what Heller
and Hills see as eminent domain's unjust redistribution of land at the
expense of landowners and residents. 242
The process of meaningful engagement under this regime requires
that if the municipality or the private developer offers an unsatisfactory
price for compensation to the LAD's constituents, the assemblage of
land would not move forward. 243 Thus, meaningfully engaging and
discussing plans with the affected community is essential. Here, the
controlling factor is the affected community's response to the private
developer's intentions to develop. This is in contrast to relying on
heightened judicial review to solve the affordable housing problem,
where the controlling factor is the private developer's response to
doctrinal limitations.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.

Id. at
Id at
Id at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id.

1468.
1503.
1467-68.
1469-72.
1469-70.
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Furthermore, affordable housing could be used as a negotiation tool
for the LAD's constituents; that is, where the municipality or private
developer fails to offer a reasonable plan to construct a fair share of
affordable housing on the parcel of land at issue, the project cannot
move forward-not because the judiciary said so, but because the
community said so. This puts the bargaining power in the hands of the
LAD constituents, making the inclusionary element of the project a
powerful land assembly tool.
LADs also focus on whether to expand the parcel of land for the
proposed development purposes. In particular, this focus is on the
construction of affordable housing at affordable rent prices, where
historically it has never been realized in large-scale development
projects. LADs also seek to utilize the benefits of condominium
developments. 244
Much of this proposal rests on transparency. Poletown245-along
with Berman and Kelo-is one of many eminent domain cases that
illustrates the transparency problem with land assembly for the affected
communities and is precisely why some argue local reform may need to
be achieved through legislation. 246 Under the LAD model, states
authorize neighborhoods, similar to NID legislation, to create LADs that
are governed through an elected board to negotiate the price of sale of
the neighborhood or the compensation for condemnation.
The holdout problems are presumably mitigated through a collective
voting procedure. 247 Here, community participation is at work. The
residents and community who have a share of the LAD have the voting
power to cause a stalemate and stop the redevelopment project from
moving forward. 248 The blight problem would be mitigated because,
with LADs, the taking cannot be justified for economic redevelopment
purposes unless blight is defined "narrowly to include only
244. Id. at 1469.
[P]roperty law can retrofit a community with a condominium-like structure
tailored to solve the problem of land assembly. To allow people to
overcome collective action barriers that might otherwise prevent them from
selling their neighborhood, the LAD places them in a special district with
the power, by a majority vote, to approve or disapprove the sale of the
neighborhood to a developer or municipality seeking to consolidate the land
into a single parcel.
Id.

245. Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981),
overruled by Cnty. of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004).
246. See Heller & Hills, supra note 196, at 1469 (noting Detroit never explained why the
neighborhood's interests were sacrificed for the common good).
247. Id at 1469-70.
248. Id at 1470.
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neighborhoods that impose extraordinary external costs on
outsiders." 249
It seems plausible that a fragmentation of income status between
landowners who share the collective voting procedure could become
unbalanced or suspect to traditional political power struggles. 250
Atlantic Yards was a social and economic faction of different
communities-a Berman-Kelo hybrid of middle class and low-income
residents in Prospect Heights. Heller and Hills argue that LADs
overcome the just compensation question because neighbors bargain
effectively for a share of the neighborhood's "assembly value" and not
simply the value of each lot. 2 5 1 They go on to say that LADs can be
designed so each individual is as well off as under current law and most
are substantially better off.25 2 It is also conceivable that LADs could
negotiate the sale of a few, or many, parcels within a neighborhood to a
developer and, at the same time, publicly support the condemnation of
other parcels in the neighborhood that are, say, blighted and place
external costs on others within the locality. Here, the LAD, on behalf of
those in need of affordable housing, could then negotiate the
construction of affordable housing with the developer on the parcels of
land condemned using any number of tools discussed herein, including
a CBA. Indeed, LADs may be of increased interest for municipalities,
private developers and communities looking to construct or preserve
affordable housing where economic redevelopment projects are
proposed.
C. Community Development Corporation

CDCs are nonprofit entities that seek to improve economically
depressed inner-city neighborhoods with, among other things,
affordable housing to recreate the social fabric of distressed areas. 2 53
CDCs combine several sources of equity and debt to construct
economic development projects. Funding usually comes from the
Urban and Rural Economic Development Program of the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services Office of Community

249.
250.
251.
252.

Id.
Id
Id.
Id

253. See Herbert J. Rubin, Renewing Hope in the Inner City: Conversations with CommunityBased Development Practitioners, 27 ADMIN. & Soc'Y 127, 137 (1995) (discussing business

activities of CDCs that subsidize affordable housing and other community programs). See
generally WILSON, supra note 22 (analyzing how the shift from the urban manufacturing sector to
the decentralized service sector has caused a substantial increase in urban poverty).
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Services ("OCS"), the Economic Development Administration
("EDA"), the Small Business Administration ("SBA") and the U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development ("H{UD"). 2 54 The
construction and preservation of affordable housing is one of the main
priorities of CDCs before the organization moves towards broader
economic development projects. 255
CDCs allow local residents to elect local CDC boards and empower
the boards' members to represent the interests of those living in a
particular locality. 256 The board then lobbies the municipality for
services, such as affordable housing, through a meaningful engagement
process along with the private developers, particularly if the
condemnation threatens to raze affordable housing. 257 Significantly, the
production of affordable housing under the CDC has resulted in positive
outcomes. 258 Some studies have found that when a CDC is employed in
a neighborhood, the quality of affordable housing is above average.
Increasingly, CDCs have grown to go beyond affordable housing
advocacy and, today, work alongside other forms of social services
providers to help protect assets for families living within the locality
where the CDC is located. 259
CDCs can purchase buildings from the existing landowners that are
subject to condemnation and propose to refurbish the buildings as
leverage to stop an incoming private developer from demolishing the
structures. However, some CDCs are unwilling to risk the investment
or unable to improve the property through capital investments for fear
that the property is targeted for condemnation. The CDCs could buy the
existing blighted property from the landowners before condemnation
and then convey the property back to the private developer on the
254. Michael H. Schill, Assessing the Role of Community Development Corporations in Inner

City Economic Development, 255 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 753, 769 (1996).
255.

See Avis C. VIDAL, REBUILDING COMMUNITIES:

A NATIONAL STUDY OF URBAN

COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATIONS 76 (1992) (noting that CDCs typically begin their

economic development activities with housing).
256. See Paul S. Grogan, Proof Positive: A Community-Based Solution to America's

Affordable Housing Crisis, 7 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 159, 159 (1996) (noting that community
residents govern CDCs).
257. But see Ram A. Cnaan, Neighborhood-Representing Organizations:How Democratic

Are They?, 65 SOC. SERVICE REv. 614, 621 (1991) ("[P]rofessionalization and detachment from
residents is more the norm than the exception."); Randy Stoecker, The CDC Model of Urban
Redevelopment: A Critique and an Alternative, 19 J. URB. AFF. 1, 8-10 (1997) (arguing that

communities do not actually control CDCs).
258. See VIDAL, supra note 255, at 78 (finding housing development was the least risky
activity of CDCs, with failure rates ranging from 17% to 38%).
259. William M. Rohe, Do Community Development CorporationsLive up to Their Billing? A
Review and Critique of the Research Findings, in SHELTER & SOCIETY: THEORY, RESEARCH,
AND POLICY FOR NONPROFIT HOUSING 177, 182-83 (C. Theodore Koebel ed., 1998).
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condition that the property be refurbished and rented at below-market
rates for the affected community. In return, the CDC promises to
publicly support the developer. This may require a small-scale CBA to
strengthen the promise and the subsequent construction of affordable
housing.
The CDC could also negotiate with the developer to purchase the
land with strings attached. This would entail persuading the developer
to purchase the land adjacent or adjoining the property where the
condemnation is to take place and use the land to construct new
affordable housing units. This would involve a costly, but worthwhile,
relocation if the relocation is negotiated within the economic
redevelopment project and mitigates the effects of exclusionary eminent
domain.
CDCs also hold the power to persuade developers to acquire the land
and quickly resell the properties to the community at a discount or to
buy the land and immediately sell it to the CDC so it can construct
affordable housing with its investments. Furthermore, the developer
can negotiate a long-term lease to build new affordable housing
structures with the affected community. The CDC, on behalf of the
affected community, would pay the developer the property rent. The
rent, therefore, would be put towards development and maintenance of
affordable housing in lieu of a bank loan. A thirty-year lease, for
example, would finance the leasehold to make available the profits
necessary for development and maintenance of the affordable housing
for the affected community who otherwise may be displaced.
The CDC could also negotiate with a private developer to acquire the
blighted property threatened by condemnation on the condition that the
private developer convert the property into affordable housing units. In
exchange, the CDC would approve of the condemnation and economic
redevelopment project. This may ensure the existing blighted property
is not demolished and sold or rented at the market rate. This would
work like a CBA, but with fewer stakeholders involved. Since the CDC
is controlled by the community, the CDC can refuse to raise rents in a
newly constructed economic redevelopment project in an effort to
preserve the existing affordable housing for community members,
thereby thwarting the loss of affordable housing.
CDCs may play an ex ante role that is at the heart of the inclusionary
eminent domain framework because their purpose is to enter into
distressed neighborhoods that may be vulnerable to condemnation. By
employing a CDC in low-income neighborhoods and establishing
procedural steps to take if and when a municipality begins eminent
domain proceedings, the community would have a plan in place to

2014]

Inclusionary Eminent Domain

901

thwart displacement, not the entire redevelopment project. This would
position the CDC to negotiate the relocation process within the
Again, inclusionary
proposed economic redevelopment project.
eminent domain seeks to constructively facilitate, not halt,
redevelopment.
In some states CDCs have been granted the power of eminent
domain. 260 However, CDCs are not designed, specifically, for the
purpose of exercising or opposing eminent domain. In contrast, LADs
are designed to focus the community on eminent domain and
subsequent sale of the neighborhood-an issue no resident can or wants
to ignore. 261 Indeed, CDCs could serve as a mechanism to organize the
initial stages of the formation of an LAD that is dedicated to creating
inclusionary affordable housing for low-income families. 262 The CDC,
however, would not receive shares of the revenue after the land was
condemned and would not have a majority veto over the decision to
condemn. 263 The LAD would, presumably, authorize both of those
things. Nonetheless, the imposition of CDCs under an inclusionary
eminent domain framework ought to be strongly considered by
communities.
D. Community Land Trust

CLTs are modeled on a landowner and property ownership scheme.
The title to the land that sits underneath the property is held by the CLT,
while the title to the property, such as an affordable housing
development, is held by the community. The CLT is the ground lessor
and the individual is the ground lessee in the ownership of fee interest
of the land. The house, however, cannot be sold beyond a set resale
price, usually set at the maximum. In CLT programs, the municipality
or the CLT usually has the right of first refusal, particularly with regard
to the purchase of affordable housing units. This scheme ensures that
the CLT can preserve affordable housing permanently.
CLTs have been enacted under section 213 of the Housing and
Community Development Act of 1992.264 The basic benefits of the
CLT give the community the ability to repurchase residential structures

260. See Asmara Tekle Johnson, Privatizing Eminent Domain: The Delegation of a Very
Public Power to Private, Non-Profit and Charitable Corporations, 56 AM. U. L. REv. 455, 492-

97 (2007) (describing the private nondelegation doctrine within the context of eminent domain).
261. See Heller & Hills, supra note 196, at 1518.
262. See id
263. Id. at 518-19.

264. Housing and Community Development Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-550, § 213, 106
Stat. 3672, 3757 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 12773).
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located on the CLT's land in the event ownership is sold. Doing so
allows for future investment, such as below-market renters or buyers,
and the opportunity to gain access to affordable housing. 265 Under
inclusionary eminent domain, CLTs would operate within the physical
boundaries of, say, a proposed economic redevelopment project where
eminent domain is being exercised or proposed. CLT members would
live within the boundaries of the CLT and have certain voting
powers. 266 The area that the CLT covers is broader than a
neighborhood locality and could include an entire town, city or county.
Residents essentially control the process by sitting on the CLT's board
of directors, serving as the drivers of meaningful engagement with the
private developer and the municipality. Members either reside on the
land of the CLT, in the properties of the CLT or within the locality of
the CLT.
Although a CLT may acquire and also expand its land holdings to
increase the supply of affordable housing, it may also acquire a single
parcel of land to develop affordable housing. 267 The CLT could also
impose its power to negotiate the sale of a parcel of land within an
economic redevelopment project on the condition that the private
developer construct affordable housing, particularly if a substantial
portion of the existing affordable housing would be lost from the
condemnation. In the event land is acquired through eminent domain
and transferred from one private owner to another, the CLT may have
the power to concentrate its land holding within a small area of land to
ensure affordable housing is either preserved or constructed. 268 In other
words, once the boundaries for an economic redevelopment project are
finalized, the community (represented by the CLT), the private
developer and the municipality can negotiate goals for affordable
housing through the conveyance of concentrated or scattered sites for

265.

See Stacey Janeda Pastel, Community Land Trusts: A Promising Alternative for

Affordable Housing, 6 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 293, 301-12 (1991) (discussing whether a
CLT's option to repurchase is an invalid restraint on alienation).
266. Id. at315.
267. See generally Christopher A. Seeger, The Fixed-Price Preemptive Right in the
Community Land Trust Lease: A Valid Response to the Housing Crisis or an Invalid Restraint on

Alienation?, 11 CARDOZO L. REv. 471 (1989) (noting that CLTs remove land from the
speculative market and create affordable housing for low income individuals).
268. Id CLTs expanded in the 1980s, particularly in urban neighborhoods, in an effort to
thwart condemnation of land for development purposes. Julie Farrell Curtin & Lance Bocarsly,
CLTs: A Growing Trend in Affordable Home Ownership, 17 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING &

COMMUNITY DEV. L. 367, 371 (2008). In 1981, Cincinnati laid claim to the first CLT in the
United States, named the Community Land Cooperative of Cincinnati. Id. The cooperative was
an association of churches organized to stop the condemnation of land and the displacement of
low-income people, predominantly African-American neighborhoods. Id.
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sale or rental units at affordable rates within the locality.
In 1989, a well-known CLT worked in collaboration with the City of
Boston. The City-CLT partnership was formed when the Dudley Street
Neighborhood Initiative ("DSNI"), the CLT, was permitted to exercise
eminent domain to redevelop and revitalize the Dudley Street
neighborhood, a blighted, dilapidated inner-city area in Boston with
widespread property abandonment. 269 However, many landowners held
out, refusing to sell. In response to the City's plan to condemn areas of
land within the Dudley neighborhood, the DSNI demanded to take
control of the area of land planned for condemnation. 270 The DSNI's
strategy was to consolidate the vacant and dilapidated properties as a
foundation for economic redevelopment that suited the wants and needs
of the community-rather than simply doing what the City of Boston
had envisioned. 271 Understandably, given the divisiveness inherent in
municipal takings of property, the City of Boston was first reluctant, but
then agreed, to give the community the power to condemn the land and
exercise eminent domain.
After some negotiations, the City authorized the DSNI to use eminent
domain to acquire the land for economic redevelopment, thereby
avoiding the lengthy process of acquiring tax-delinquent and abandoned
properties. 272 In creating a CLT, the DSNI assembled 132 parcels of
land between 1991 and 1994.273 During that time period, nearly 400
single-family, duplex and triplex affordable housing units were built in
the locality. The DSNI preserved 740 houses by using its funds to
refurbish existing structures that needed repairs.
E. Land Bank

LABs are inventories of surplus land that are primarily established by
redevelopment authorities or municipalities to manage undeveloped
land until the market spurs potential buyers to develop it. Over the last
forty years, local governments have designed this new land assembly
tool to revitalize blighted, vacant and abandoned property that threatens
to decrease the value of the land. LABs focus on vacant, abandoned
269.

See PETER MEDOFF & HOLLY SKLAR, STREETS OF HOPE: THE FALL AND RISE OF AN

URBAN NEIGHBORHOOD 43 (1994) (noting that 30% of the Dudley neighborhood is vacant; the
remaining population is characterized by low income, low education levels and high
unemployment).
270. Id. at 126.
271. Id. at 120.
272. Id. at 119 (noting that DSNI was the first community group in the nation to win the right
of eminent domain).
273.

DOUGLAS R. PORTER, URBAN LAND INST., EMINENT DOMAIN: AN IMPORTANT TOOL

FOR COMMUNITY REVITALIZATION 24 (2007).
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and tax-delinquent parcels of land in urban areas, and the general goal is
to reinvigorate these properties and cultivate them as assets for
community development and redevelopment. 274 Land Banks function
best in situations where the needs and concerns of the community are
not being met; they respond to those needs by converting vacant and
abandoned land into assets that contribute to the health and vitality of
the community. 275
Vacant, blighted and abandoned property is, invariably, affordable
for those who may have no other means to afford shelter, despite the
fact that such practices may be considered a form of squatting or illegal
occupancy. The property is usually inferior and becomes a target for
condemnation. But municipalities, for many different reasons, have
neglected to invest resources into the properties, fearing that the costs
put towards revitalizing the areas will not lure private developers to
make future investments in the property. The properties are also subject
to illegal occupancy and under-maintenance from slumlords who thrive
on dilapidated buildings to provide a source of affordable housing for
the poor in the inner-cities-many times in relative proximity to jobs
and transportation-where it would otherwise not be available due to
other factors, such as gentrification of other areas within the city.
LABs were initially proposed as a substantial land-use planning tool
when authorized at the state and local levels of government. 276 More
accurately, the LAB was created for land use control purposes so that
"land inventory could be used to impact the costs of land for private and
public development." 2 77 Indeed, the LAB was developed to deal with a
range of social and cultural problems; it "was limited only by the
creative imagination of social and urban planners." 278
Charles Haar envisioned public authorities that-by the acquisition of
parceled land and undeveloped land-employ LABs to directly impact
the fluctuation of land values and allow local governments to undertake
land use control. 279 In the face of nuisance laws, exclusionary zoning

274. See generally Frank S. Alexander, Land Bank Strategies for Renewing Urban Land, 14 J.
AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 140 (2004) (discussing how LABs can operate
as a local governmental authority to turn liabilities into assets).
275. Id. at 141.
276. Id.
277. Id. at 143.
278. Id.
279. See Wanted: Two Federal Levers for Urban Land Use-Land Banks and Urbank: Paper
submitted to Subcomm. on Hous. Panels ofH Comm. on Banking and Currency, 92d Cong. 927940 (1971) (statement of Charles M. Haar, Professor of Law, Harvard Law School), cited in CTR.
FOR URBAN POLICY RESEARCH, LAND USE CONTROLS: PRESENT PROBLEMS AND FUTURE
REFORM 365-79 (David Listokin ed., 1974). The first LAB was established in the 1970s in St.
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and urban renewal, LABs served as a new tool for dealing with the
inefficient use of land. 280
However, redevelopment authorities-faced with the rapid decline of
some inner-city parcels of land-did not reclaim or redevelop the
areas. 281 Nor were private developers convinced by market forces to
invest in the areas. Therefore, as a governmental entity, LABs assemble
and bank land to be converted into productive, short-term and long-term
uses. 282 Indeed, the tool expedites the urban redevelopment process in
declining areas and puts the land to use for other purposes or in
conjunction with other land assembly tools, such as CDCs or CLTs. As
a matter of fee simple ownership, the blighted property that sits on the
land is reserved by its owners, but stands idle with no apparent
productive use. 283
Since LABs are flexible in form and function, they can be adjusted to
various land assembly purposes. 284 Here, in the face of condemnation
that threatens the loss of affordable housing, LABs can construct or
preserve affordable housing where it already exists, albeit in a
physically inadequate form. 285 If used to control urban sprawl caused,
in part, by exclusionary zoning, LABs could be adjusted to fix the
exclusionary eminent domain problem by serving as an inclusionary
housing development tool by banking, and then earmarking, the land for
affordable housing so it may be targeted for economic
redevelopment. 286
LABs, like CDCs, can acquire land for purposes of developing

Louis, Missouri by the St. Louis Revitalization Authority. Redevelopment authorities historically
have held the power to issue tax-exempt financing and exercise the power of eminent domain to
revitalize dilapidated and blighted land. See generally Kenneth R. Langsdorf, Urban Decay,
Property Tax Delinquency: A Solution in St. Louis, 5 URB. LAW. 729 (1973) (discussing the tax

breaks and power of eminent domain that statutory redevelopment corporations in Missouri
enjoy).
280. Haar, supra note 279, at 933.
281. See Alexander, supra note 274, at 142 (noting the forces that inhibited public
development authorities in efforts to reclaim and redevelop blighted and tax-delinquent
properties).
282. Id.
283. See id. (noting that LABs are comprised of both privately and publicly owned "stagnant"
homes).
284. See id. at 142, 147 (noting that there "is no single form or function to land banks" and
that this "variation ... is essential" for LABs to function).
285.

See generally Patricia A. Hemann, Land Banking Tax Delinquent Property:Reform and

Revitalization, 27 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 517 (1978) (discussing the use of LABs to revitalize urban
areas which have become blighted and filled with abandoned properties).
286. See generally HARVEY L. FLECHNER, LAND BANKING IN THE CONTROL OF URBAN

DEVELOPMENT (1974) (providing an overview of land bank programs including their functions
and role in urban redevelopment).
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affordable housing. LABs and CDCs operate similarly in that both
advance acquisition of parcels of land for future purposes of affordable
housing development. 287 The meaningful engagement process takes
place largely between the municipality, public authority or state agency
banking the land.
The LAB combines elements of long-term proposals and projectspecific approaches to banking land. 288 Thus, in the face of the threat of
exclusionary eminent domain, CDCs can bank land for future purposes
by acquiring, holding and designating sites for affordable housing
development for low-income and moderate-income families who may
be displaced by condemnation elsewhere.
The LAB can also be designed for a single public purpose, such as
economic redevelopment. 289 The land banking process focuses on a
single geographic area for the purpose of acquiring and assembling land
for, say, affordable housing development. 290 Since land assemblage in
targeted, single parcels of land is unavailable or difficult to obtain by
way of open-market acquisitions, the exercise of eminent domain can be
delegated to or exercised on behalf of the LAB. 2 9 1 In the event a
private developer requests that a municipality condemn land for
economic redevelopment purposes, land banking can also induce the
development of affordable housing by providing the public financial
subsidies in the form of tax-exempt financing, low-interest loans or tax
abatements for the private developer in exchange for the affordable
housing development on the land targeted for condemnation. 2 92 Indeed,
the key components of the LAB scheme are: (1) "public acquisition and
holding of land as a form of land use .. . control" and (2) "the public
acquisition of land for transfer to private third parties for use and
development." 2 93 In the context of inclusionary eminent domain, LABs
can play a significant role in staving off the exclusionary effects of
condemnation because the municipality-already holding property for
future investment-can spur private developers to utilize the existing
property for affordable housing.
287. See Alexander, supra note 274, at 145 (contrasting the acquisition of property by
nonprofit housing development corporations to that of LABs).
288. Id.
289. Id
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Id. See generally Langsdorf, supra note 279 (discussing the use of public financial
subsidies and eminent domain to encourage private redevelopment by third parties).
293. Alexander, supra note 274, at 145; see also Richard P. Fishman & Robert D. Gross,
Public Land Banking: A New Praxis for Urban Growth, 23 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 897, 899

(1972) (discussing the modem goals and purposes of land banking).
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In fact, some of the earliest proposals for LABs sought to assemble
large amounts of land as a form of local land use planning, while other
proposals dabbled with the idea of giving the redevelopment authority
the power of eminent domain. 294 But, for constitutional reasons, many
LABs are not designed with the authority to condemn land-that power
still remains with the municipality. And, although the exercise of
eminent domain is sometimes suggested for LABs, municipalities rarely
grant it.295

However, the LAB does have the authority to acquire properties from
municipalities, such as foreclosed or surplus properties or as a result of
voluntary donations and transfers from private owners. 296 Communities
subject to threats of losing affordable housing to condemnation may,
therefore, have the ability to acquire ownership over a parcel bf land
that has been banked by the municipality and use the land as leverage in
negotiations with private developers. The purchase or lease of property
on the open market would allow the LAB to negotiate the purchase of
neglected property from a private owner. 297 Communities are not the
only stakeholders that could acquire the banked land from the
municipality; private developers could also acquire the properties.
The holding of land by the municipality could lure the private
developer to enter into negotiations to complete the project with the
affordable housing interests of the affected community. The LAB also
focuses on transfers of property at nominal prices to facilitate the
construction or preservation of affordable housing where it is threatened
by condemnation. 298 A LAB often transfers property "in anticipation
that the transferee will undertake certain commitments concerning
development and future use of the property." 299 An offer made by the
municipality to a private developer to acquire the banked land prior to
commencing eminent domain proceedings could ensure that affordable
housing is refurbished and has significant positive impacts on the
affordable housing market within an economic redevelopment project.
The potential for an inclusionary relationship between LABs and
other land assembly tools proposed in this Article is significant, in part,
due to the fact that corporations or individuals can apply to purchase
property from the LAB. 300 Some land banks may give preference to
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.

See Alexander, supranote 274, at 143.
Id at 150, 156.
Id. at 150-51.
Id. at 152.
Id. at 154.
Id. at 163.
Id. at 160.
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non-profit corporations that plan to use the property to create affordable
housing, while others make the property available to private
corporations. 301 Thus, LABs that operate within an area targeted for
condemnation have the authority to transfer the property to a private
developer who plans for economic redevelopment of the land. The
process of banking, then transferring, the land establishes a sales price
for the land sold to a private developer to use for constructing
affordable housing at a reasonable percentage of the standard price. 302
And since the LAB is primarily concerned with transferring land to
transferees whose primary goal is to hold ownership of the land for
future resale, the sale of the properties to a private developer benefitting
from the exercise of eminent domain may allow the developerincentivized by tax-exemptions and other conditions-to sell or rent the
property to the affected community at below-market rates to ensure the
community is not displaced by exclusionary eminent domain.
F. NeighborhoodImprovement District

NIDs 303

are one of many variations of improvement districts that
exist throughout the United States, including Business Improvement
Districts ("BIDs"), 30 4 Block-Level Improvement Districts ("BLIDs") 3 05
and Private Neighborhood Associations ("PNAs"). 306
Local
301. Id.
302. The St. Louis Land Bank sells the land to non-profit entities who will utilize the property
for a "strong public purpose" at 50% of the standard price. Id.
303. This section focuses on the NID Act under Pennsylvania law. See Neighborhood
Improvement District Act, 73 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 831-40 (2013). This is primarily to simplify
the conversation and for convenience since I am acquainted with the NID legislation in
Pennsylvania.
304.

For a comprehensive discussion of BIDs, see ROBERT ELLICKSON & VICKI BEEN, LAND

USE CONTROLS 619-34 (2005) (discussing the concepts and practical utility of special
assessments and BIDs); Wayne Batchis, Privatized Government in a Diverse Urban
Neighborhood:Mt. Airy Business Improvement District, 3 DREXEL L. REv. 109 (2010); Richard
Briffault, A Governmentfor Our Time? Business Improvement Districts and Urban Governance,

99 COLUM. L. REv. 365, 366-74 (1999) [hereinafter Briffault, Urban Governance]; Richard
Briffault, The Business Improvement DistrictComes ofAge, 3 DREXEL L. REv. 19 (2010); Gerald

E. Frug, The Seductions of Form, 3 DREXEL L. REv. 11, 17 (2010); Robert Stokes, The
Challenges of Using BIDs in Lower-Income Areas: The Case of Germantown, Philadelphia,3
DREXEL L. REV. 325 (2010); Thomas J. Vicino, New Boundaries of Urban Governance: An
Analysis ofPhiladelphia'sUniversity City Improvement District, 3 DREXEL L. REv. 339 (2010).

305. BLIDs are residential communities similar to BIDS that enable residents to acquire
resources such as local public goods. Within inclusionary eminent domain, BLIDs are perhaps
yet another tool to place more pressure on private developers to include services to the displaced
communities where eminent domain is used. Importantly, a BLID would focus its attention
towards protecting the rights of dissenting landowners and displaced communities. Robert C.
Ellickson, New Institutionsfor Old Neighborhoods, 48 DUKE L.J. 75, 97-98 (1998).

306. PNAs may serve as another alternative tool for inclusionary eminent domain. PNAs
function as condominium-like communities. PNAs are made up of concurrent supermajorities of
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governance models, such as NIDS, are enabled by state regulations and
designed as group property institutions that can be retrofitted to an
existing community where eminent domain is considered for economic
redevelopment. However, this Article focuses on the NID due to its
extremely local design and its focus on improvements for residential
property owners and renters within a designated area. The designated
NID area could potentially be drawn for purposes of alleviating the
exclusionary impact of eminent domain in high-density areas of cities.
NIDs are geographic areas within a municipality where a special
assessment is levied on all designated property, other than tax-exempt
property, for the purpose of promoting the economic and general
welfare of the district and the municipality. The NID funds are utilized
to supplement city services, such as streetlights, managing parking lots
and other security measures. 307 Here, the NID assessment may finance
the provision of positive externalities that generally benefit the assessed
area or construction of an improvement, such as affordable housing, that
would generate economic activity, increase property values or generally
create an inclusive environment. 308 Unlike BIDs, NIDs are primarily
created to improve residential, not commercial or business, areas within
a locality. NIDs seek to fix some of the collective action problems
found in areas that are both commercial and residential and are thus
composed of different-sized structures that serve different functions. 309
existing owners and renters of residential and commercial properties. The Association would
enable members to coerce individual owners to join. The board would have the power to sell
changes in use, such as selling the community as a whole for redevelopment. Nelson notes that
the creation of such associations in already established neighborhoods is very difficult because
"the transaction costs of assembling unanimous neighborhood consents voluntarily would be
prohibitive." Robert H. Nelson, Privatizingthe Neighborhood: A Proposal to Replace Zoning
with Private Collective Property Rights to Existing Neighborhoods, 7 GEO. MASON L. REv. 827,

833-34 (1999).
307. Briffault, Urban Governance, supra note 304, at 368-69.
308. See generally Kenneth A. Stahl, NeighborhoodEmpowerment and the Future of the City,

161 U. PA. L. REv. 939 (2013). Stahl elaborates on the concerns of authors such as Ellickson and
Liebmann, arguing that because a "neighborhood has unfettered ability to control its own land
use," use of neighborhood controlled zoning results in "not in my backyard" ("NIMBY")
impulses and exclusionary practices that deny in-demand resources, such as low-income housing
developments. Id. at 995.
309. Heller and Hills focus their LAD proposal on the intra-group exploitation problem that
NIDs seek to overcome. Heller & Hills, supranote 196, at 1521.
[T]he opportunities for intra-group exploitation are high in a neighborhood composed
of different-sized structures serving different functions. The possibility that residential
owners would burden commercial structures with onerous restrictions is matched only
by the possibility that commercial owners would burden residential owners with
noxious uses. Even among residential owners, the owners of large and small buildings
would have persistently different interests that would invite intra-neighborhood
squabbling.
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Further, blight removal is not a prerequisite for establishing a NID. The
decision-making body is also representative of the residents within the
NID.
The municipal corporation-a body or board authorized to enact
ordinances or resolutions, such as a City Council-has the power to
establish an authority to administer the NID improvements. 31 0 The
municipal corporation can also choose an existing CDC located within
the NID designated area to administer the funds for improvements. A
governing body is created by group representatives from the
community-called
the
neighborhood
improvement
district
management association ("NIDMA")-that levies assessments and
makes other decisions concerning the improvements of the
neighborhood when there is not a local CDC.
The revenue generated is funneled back into the NID fund and
dispersed for neighborhood improvements. 311 Although NIDs are
primarily designed to upgrade and maintain residential areas, some NID
legislation allows for commercial property within or abutting the NID
area, and thus local business owners are sometimes members of the
NIDMA. 3 12 However, the purpose of the NID, in contrast to the BID, is
to ensure that improvements districts do not center primarily on
business development, but on residential neighborhood development.
In low-income neighborhoods, some states allow the NIDMA to
exempt residential property owners from any special assessment fee
levied and instead levy a higher assessment on participating businesses
within the NID. Other states require residents to pay a nominal amount,
such as $1, to prevent burdening an already low-income community.
Residents and business owners can petition the City Council to
designate the NID where the municipality has not taken such action, but

Id.
310. See Neighborhood Improvement District Act, 73 PA. CONS. STAT. § 834(1) (2013)
("Every municipal corporation shall have the power ... [t]o establish within the municipality an
area or areas designated as an NID.").
311. See id. § 837(b)(1).
The NIDMA shall, upon approval by the governing body of the municipality, have the
power to assess property owners within the NID a special assessment fee. Revenues
from the fee shall be accounted for and used by the NIDMA to make improvements
and provide programs and services within the NID as authorized by this act. Where the
district established is a BID, the NIDMA shall have the authority to exempt residential
property owners from any special assessment fees levied.
Id.
312. See id. § 834(10) (explaining that the municipal corporation has the power "[t]o levy an
assessment fee on property owners located within an NID needed to finance additional
supplemental programs, services and improvements to be provided or made by the NIDMA").
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the ultimate decision to establish a NID rests with the municipal
corporation. The responsibility for drawing boundaries rests with the
entity that proposes the NID, which many times includes a variety of
local neighborhood stakeholders and residents. 313
The initial NID proposal to the municipal corporation must include
proposed revenue sources for financing the proposed improvements
within its boundaries. Revenue for the NID is primarily generated from
the assessments, but some states have enacted NID legislation to allow
the municipal corporation to issue and generate bonds, notes or
guarantees to finance improvements within the NID. 3 14 The bonds may
be retired by a further assessment on the property owners on an
equitable basis. The municipal corporation also has the power to
advance some of the funds to the NIDMA, or to the local CDC, to carry
out the purposes and goals of the NID.
These provisions within NID legislation are what make NIDs more
powerful than other small-scale neighborhood improvement areas with
minimal streams of revenue. The issuance of bonds and other forms of
monies, including the authority to "[a]ppropriate and expend NID funds
which would include any Federal, State or municipal funds received by
the NIDMA" from the City Council is a useful, and perhaps attractive,
tool for private developers seeking to invest in affordable housing
developments in the community. 315 Those funds can be "expend[ed] in
accordance with the specific provisions of the municipal enabling
ordinance" establishing the NID. 3 16
Given the close proximity and interaction with the municipal
authority and private developers under the NID scheme, NIDs have a
strong incentive to eliminate abandoned and blighted buildings using
their partial authority to condemn property through eminent domain. 317
Under state or local legislation, a NID has the authority to identify
deteriorating buildings, outline a detailed proposal for rehabilitation of
the buildings within a locality and condemn land to acquire and then
refurbish or construct new affordable housing. 318
313. See id § 835(c)(1) (stating the plan must include "[a] map indicating the boundaries, by
street, of the proposed NID; however, a designated property may not be included in more than
one NID"); see also id. § 835(a)(1) (providing that "[t]he governing body of the municipality or
any municipal businesses or residents or combination thereof may initiate action to establish an
NID or NIDs").
314. Id. § 834(7).
315. Id. § 837(a)(8).
316. Id § 834(3) (internal punctuation omitted).
317. See id. § 834(6) (stating the municipal corporation has the power to acquire property
through eminent domain in order to "mak[e] physical improvements within the NID").
318. See generally id § 834 (outlining the powers municipal corporations may bestow on
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The initial stages of the NID proposal would need to explicitly state
that one of the primary improvements the NID seeks is a fair share
percentage of affordable housing to be constructed or preserved on the
site condemned for development. Private developers will likely be open
to the fair share option because most states have NIDs with alternative
revenue streams that would assist in the financing of the inclusionary
housing.
From an ex ante perspective, the proposed use of eminent domain
proceedings by a municipality should spur the affected community to
consider the designation of a NID within the economic redevelopment
project area. Then, from an ex post position, the local CDC, in
collaboration with the city council and private developer, would
meaningfully engage. This would entail meeting to map out and draw
what portion of the redevelopment project would be designated as a
NID and what portion of revenue from the special assessment and other
local, state and federal funds would go towards substituting the
anticipated loss of housing with new affordable developments.
Most NID legislation also requires a comprehensive plan that draws
"[a] map indicating the boundaries, by street, of the proposed NID."319
Here, the private developer and municipality can offer numerous ways
to assist the NID area with development of affordable housing in that
area. The funds accessible through the NID from local and state taxes
would assist in the maintenance and repair of the areas surrounding the
affordable housing, such as street cleaning, light maintenance and other
local amenities, thus working to mitigate blight and decay over time.
Similar to the CBA, the creation of a NID can be used as a public
approval mechanism: We will support the taking of property for
economic redevelopment purposes in exchange for the creation of a
NID and designation of its powers, under applicable NID legislation, to
a local CDC to improve the area, including the oversight of
development of affordable housing units with the private developer.
While CBAs bind the parties through a number of promises, including
housing, on a contractual document, the NID places a structural
organization within the economic redevelopment project area that helps
maintain-at least to a certain extent-the integrity of the
neighborhood. Indeed, the prospect of righting the wrongs of the past
by giving back a certain degree of community empowerment through
meaningful engagement, participation and public approval within an
economic redevelopment project is an exciting, but still evolving,
NIDs).
319. See id. §835(c)(1).
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phenomenon under an inclusionary eminent domain model. Overlaying
a NID boundary within an economic redevelopment project is
increasingly becoming an important tool in the post-Kelo era for
constructing and preserving affordable housing.
CONCLUSION

This Article calls for developers, municipalities and communities to
rethink how to plan for inclusion. Inclusionary eminent domain is a
new normative concept to help us rethink how to fix the exclusionary
eminent domain phenomenon and remedy condemnations that threaten
the loss of affordable housing and displacement of low-income
communities. Heightened judicial review, as proposed by Dana, in and
of itself, may not solve the ubiquitous problems of inefficient land
assembly and shortage of affordable housing. Post-Kelo legislation
barring condemnations for economic redevelopment is not likely to
adequately solve the exclusionary phenomenon. Indeed, this Article
makes a normative case by proposing CBAs, LADs, CDCs, CLTs,
LABs and NIDs as crucial tools that are part of this broader framework
of inclusion to guide municipalities, private developers and
communities on how to assemble land taken through eminent domain.
However, the question that remains is whether the legal doctrine
framing takings law can embody the norms proposed in this Article.
The model proposed here is just one of many steps in what is an
organic and evolving paradigm in takings law and economic
redevelopment. The next phase of this paradigm very well may lead to
state legislatures considering how to structure statutes that require the
practices advocated here, city councils amending ordinances to mandate
the implementation of the tools or courts who may want to uphold the
inclusionary practices by ordering the municipalities to utilize some of
the tools as a matter of state constitutional law or zoning enabling law.
This, of course, would require a comprehensive assessment of the
constitutionality of legislatively enforced and judicially mandated
inclusionary eminent domain, which would also substantiate the
normative position set forth in this Article.
This Article, though, seeks to start that conversation and to
acknowledge the realization that public use, in the most local
community sense, is an integral part of the exercise of takings for
economic redevelopment. Inclusionary eminent domain is a framework
to nurture and facilitate the process.

